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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The main purpose of sensor networks is to utilize the distributed sensing 
capability provided by tiny, low powered and low-cost devices. (Jamshidi 
2009, 20) 
In future concepts of undersea warfare, traditional mine warfare systems may be 
replaced with networks of sensors providing information to mobile, intercept-to-engage 
weapons. While current naval minefield modeling and simulation capabilities provide 
planners with the capability to design and evaluate the effectiveness of minefields using 
legacy naval mine capabilities, they are not adequate for planning and assessing the 
performance of new concepts under consideration (Ponirakis 2014). The Modeling 
Engagements of Nodal Targeting And Logic: Flexible Options for Continued Undersea 
Superiority (Mental Focus) team used systems engineering principles to identify and 
address this gap in the Navy’s ability to predict and evaluate the performance potential of 
these future mine warfare architectures. 
The Mental Focus team identified the system requirements for a simulation 
system capable of predicting the performance of these future systems and evaluating their 
mission effectiveness. Appling Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles, 
the team developed a conceptual architecture model and used it to validate the 
completeness and consistency of proposed top-level requirements. The team used 
software engineering techniques to develop a prototype simulation system, demonstrating 
the conceptual solution approach. 
Finally, the team used the prototype simulation system to conduct an initial 
analysis of the potential benefits of future mine warfare architectures. Using the 
prototype simulation system, the team compared the performance of a legacy mine 
system and a future undersea weapon system (FUWS) of distributed sensors linked with 
autonomous mobile weapons. The team’s analysis showed that the FUWS could provide 
improved, sustained performance compared to the legacy mine system. The prototype 
simulation system showed the threat presented to the enemy by a legacy mine system 
decayed exponentially as sequential enemy vessels forced a channel through the 
 xx 
minefield. In the scenarios considered, by the sixth transiting vessel less than 20% of the 
original threat remained, despite the fact that upwards of 90% of the mines remained in 
the minefield. The FUWS, however, continued to present a significant threat to each 
vessel transiting the minefield, decaying only as the weapons in the system were 
exhausted. The increased threat presented by FUWS and its ability to sustain that threat 
are functions of the FUWS architecture and how it employs a many-to-many relationship 
between sensors and weapons. 
The team contends that the change in the performance characteristics resulting 
from the change in system architecture warrants a reconsideration of the simple initial 
threat (SIT) as the principal minefield measure of performance. When both architectures 
provide similar ranges of initial threats to the first vessel, the sustained capability of the 













With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be 
strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. (Sun Tzu) 
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Currently, there are a number of gaps within minefield planning, 
modeling, and simulation capabilities. With the emergence of new mining 
technologies, new software methodologies are needed to investigate 
capabilities, drive new requirements and measures of effectiveness, 
address training needs, and to meet Navy strategic goals. (Ponirakis 2014) 
In U.S. Navy doctrine, mine warfare (MIW) includes both the use of sea mines to 
project power and shape enemy behavior and the use of various systems and tactics 
required to defeat and deny the enemy’s use of mines. Figure 1 shows this hierarchy, 
overlapped with the two Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) provided by MIW. Over the past 
few decades, the Navy has invested significantly more resources in Mine 
Countermeasures (MCM) as a Force Protection capability than in sea mines as a principal 
Force Application capability1 (Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment 2001, 36). 
Recently, however, the Navy has expressed renewed interest in sea mines as means of 
Force Application and has begun to explore new concepts of sea mines that leverage 
recent technological advances (Holmes et al. 2014, 7). This project developed system 
requirements for the modeling and simulation systems required to support development 
and employment of these future mining capabilities. 
 
Figure 1.  Mine Warfare Hierarchy (adapted from NWP 3-15) 
                                                 
1 This disparity in focus is not only seen in the allocation of financial resources. The current mine 
warfare strategic guidance, 21st-Century U.S. Navy Mine Warfare, dedicates over 95% of the document to 
MCM capabilities and less than 5% to mining capabilities. 
Mine Warfare 
Mining 




JCA 3 Force Application JCA 7 Force Protection 
 2 
As the Navy explores these new concepts of sea mine capabilities, it requires the 
supporting tools to evaluate and predict the effectiveness of the concepts. Current naval 
minefield modeling and simulation capabilities provide planners with the capability to 
design and evaluate the effectiveness of minefields using legacy naval mine capabilities. 
These tools, however, are not adequate for the planning and performance modeling of 
new concepts under consideration (Ponirakis 2014). This report reviews the current status 
in naval mine warfare development, verifies the gap in modeling and simulation 
capability, and uses system engineering processes to derive solution requirements. These 
system requirements are provided to the Navy to inform future capability development 
efforts.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The sea mine was introduced during the American Revolution and the 
land mine during the American Civil War. Both are products of American 
ingenuity. In 1970, absent a fitting definition, the National Academy of 
Sciences’ Mine Advisory Committee defined the mine as a “weapon that 
waits.”  (Hunt 1998) 
From the Bushnell brothers’ 1778 attack on the British fleet with kegs of 
gunpowder fitted with contact fuses (PEO LMW 2009, 3) to the 1991 deployment of 
Quickstrike2 mines in the northern Arabian Gulf (6), the sea mine has been the original 
“long-endurance robotic warrior” (Hunt 1998). Once deployed, the mine “waits” with a 
degree of autonomy available in few other weapon systems. 
As general technological development accelerated in the last 60 years, sea mine 
technological development has been comparatively stagnant. The last revolutionary 
advancement in sea mine capabilities was the introduction of the bottom influence mine 
during World War II; today’s legacy mines largely represent 1960s technology (Hunt 
1998). As recently as 2009, the Navy’s official strategy for naval mining capability 
development was entirely focused on upgrading the Quickstrike mine with an improved 
firing mechanism, the Mk 71 Target Detection Device (TDD). While the TDD provided 
                                                 
2 Originally deployed during the Vietnam War, the aircraft deployed, bottom influence Quickstrike 
family of naval mines comprises the legacy mining capability of the Navy. The Quickstrike family includes 
the Mk 62 and Mk 63 converted bombs and the Mk 65 dedicated thin wall mine (PEO LMW 2009, 25). 
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evolutionary improvements to the sensor, targeting logic, and counter-countermeasures 
capabilities (PEO LMW, 25–26), it did not fundamentally change the mine’s architecture 
or planning parameters. Sea mines remain fixed, isolated, explode-in-place weapon 
systems virtually unchanged for over half a century. 
The application of recent technological developments in solid-state electronics 
miniaturization, reliable undersea communication, and new high yield explosive 
compounds to the naval mining problem has the potential to reinvigorate development of 
sea mine capabilities and introduce radical changes to the legacy architecture (Hunt 
1998). The successor to today’s explode-in-place mines will likely rely less on the paired 
sensor-weapon architecture and more on an array of distributed sensors linked with 
mobile weapons in a networked architecture. To evaluate and quantify the potential 
benefits of this radical change in future naval mine system architectures, this project 
focused on the engineering and conceptual design of a software system capable of 
modeling these future systems and evaluating their effectiveness. 
The Modeling Engagements of Nodal Targeting And Logic: Flexible Options for 
Continued Undersea Superiority (Mental Focus) Simulation Application (MFSA) 
provides the user with the ability to determine the effectiveness of planned configurations 
of sensors and weapons available in a futuristic net-centric naval mine system. Because 
this technologically advanced architecture provides for new emergent capabilities, the 
MFSA evaluates new, more complex, measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in addition to 
the traditional minefield MOEs. 
B. FUTURE UNDERSEA WEAPON SYSTEM (FUWS)  
The Advanced Undersea Weapon System (AUWS) is a group of 
unmanned systems (sensors, effectors, communications, and vehicles) that 
can be pre-positioned to autonomously and persistently influence the 
adversary at a time and place of our choosing. (Edwards and Gallagher 
2014) 
During his 2009 “State of Mine Warfare” annual presentation to the CNO, the 
Commander Naval Mine and ASW Command (NMAWC), RADM Frank Drennan, 
coined the concept of Advanced Undersea Weapons System (AUWS). RADM Drennan 
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noted that naval “mines” should no longer be thought of as dumb, immobile weapons 
waiting for unsuspecting mariners to run into them; but rather, that existing and 
developing technologies could transform the historic naval mine into a system of 
distributed sensors and moveable weapons with vastly improved capability. In 2010–
2011 the Naval Postgraduate School System Engineering Analysis Cohort 17, Team B 
(SEA17B), developed and analyzed AUWS as an alternative concept for providing 
undersea warfare (USW) dominance (Emmersen et al. 2011, vii). The AUWS concept 
provides an innovative, flexible, modular system of systems approach to future naval 
mining capabilities. Because it provides a useful architecture for what a future naval mine 
system may look like, the Mental Focus project used this future concept, as articulated by 
SEA17B, as a representative instantiation of a potential future system of systems 
approach to naval mine warfare. The term AUWS has since been adopted by the Office 
of Naval Research (ONR) as a particular research and development program (Everhart 
2012), the Advanced Undersea Weapon3 System. Because of the potential ambiguity 
associated with the AUWS, the Mental Focus project used the umbrella term Future 
Undersea Weapon System (FUWS) to describe a broad set of possible concepts, 
including the instantiations of AUWS. This allowed the project to leverage the 
conceptual approach of SEA17B without being tied to the particular architecture selected 
by ONR. 
As shown in the high-level operational concept (Figure 2), this notional advanced 
mining system of systems promises increased flexibility, relative to legacy minefields, by 
employing distributed sensors and modular effectors4 to generate desired tactical and 
operational effects. Figure 2 shows a distributed sensor network detecting the presence of 
a submerged threat target. The sensors communicate the presence of the threat to a 
weapon, such as the encapsulated torpedo on the right, which then engages the target 
al.so shown in Figure 2 is a surface warship detected by the distributed sensor network. 
                                                 
3 Note the change from warfare system to weapon system. This project used the term weapon system 
to describe a physical system procured and employed to deliver a military capability. The term warfare 
system is used to describe the systematic employment of the art and science of operational warfare. 
4 Effector is a term used to describe mines or weapon payloads in the AUWS architecture (SEA17B 
2011, 32). This term is used interchangeably with mine and weapon payload throughout the project.  
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The system has yet to engage this target, but it may soon direct engagement with the 
weapons battery in the lower left of the figure when the target meets engagement criteria. 
While Figure 2 shows a FUWS deployed in a seaport closure scenario, where the 
operational commander is attempting to deny the enemy access to and from their own 
seaport (offensive mining), the FUWS concept may also be used to influence enemy 
operational behavior in the defense of friendly seaports (protective mining) as well as in 
open-ocean, area-denial scenarios (defensive mining). 
 
Figure 2.   FUWS Operational Concept (adapted from Everhart 2012) 
C. CAPABILITY GAP  
Capability Gap—The inability to meet or exceed a capability requirement, 
resulting in an associated operational risk until closed or mitigated. The 
gap may be the result of no fielded capability, lack of proficiency or 
sufficiency in a fielded capability solution, or the need to replace a fielded 
capability solution to prevent a future gap. (CJCSI 3170.01I 2015) 
There are a variety of potential FUWS weapons configurations that leverage 
existing and/or developmental technologies varying in size, cost, complexity, lethality, 
 6 
range, and speed. In some scenarios, it may be necessary to increase weapon quantity, 
with range and lethality being less important. While in other scenarios, a larger explosive 
charge in combination with increased range and speed may be more likely to produce the 
required effects. Each weapon payload has different performance characteristics, which 
will allow the overall system of systems to be tailored for a particular desired mission 
outcome. 
In order to develop and employ such systems in an effective manner, the Navy 
requires a decision-support simulation system that accurately models the detection of a 
target, decision logic, communication of target parameters, and engagement of the target 
with a selected weapon.5  Without establishing a properly abstracted simulation system 
architecture, it will be difficult to establish realistic decision-support system-level 
performance requirements and the associated subsystem allocated requirements. 
Additionally, operational planners need the ability to develop mine employment plans 
and accurately predict the effectiveness of planned configurations of weapons and 
sensors.  
D. PROJECT SCOPE 
The project scope was based on addressing this gap in mine simulation and 
planning capability using available resources. The MFSA high-level operational concept 
(Figure 3) provides a graphical representation of the MFSA in operation. 
The MFSA system provides warfare center program analysts and capability 
developers the ability to understand and optimize the effectiveness of a particular 
configuration, supporting alternative analysis and informing capability development. The 
MFSA also provides minefield planners at reach-back support commands the ability to 
optimize the effectiveness of a particular configuration, supporting operational decisions 
and tactical system deployment. 
However, because the project was not resourced to deliver a mature, fully 
functional, and integrated decision support system, the Mental Focus team focused efforts 
                                                 
5 The applicable required JCA is 5.3.5 Analyze Courses of Action: The ability to evaluate potential 
solutions to determine likelihood of success. 
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on MFSA requirement analysis and architecture development. The project team used a 
prime directive statement to ensure efforts remained focused on the MFSA statement of 
need, project goals to communicate the desired project end state, and a prototype 
simulation system to visualize and demonstrate the system requirements and architecture. 
 
Figure 3.  MFSA Operational View (OV-1) 
During the literature review, the project team determined that most current efforts 
in the AUWS concept development have been directed at analyzing the required sensor 
systems and that significantly less effort was being focused on the required weapon 
system components. By focusing on the weapons portion of the FUWS concept, the 
analytic efforts of the Mental Focus project contribute to capability developer 
understanding at stakeholder organizations. This helps to shape the U.S. Navy’s future 
undersea warfare capabilities and directly supports the Chief of Naval Operations’ 
(CNO’s) vision of continued undersea dominance (Greenert 2011, 2). 
MFSA will provide stakeholders with the ability to evaluate alternative FUWS 
configurations in various mission scenarios and optimize the system performance to 
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achieve desired operational effectiveness. Capability developers may use the tool to 
evaluate alternative tactics and materiel components, support development of future 
undersea weapon systems and inform development priorities. 
1. System Context and Prime Directive 
As shown in the MFSA context diagram (Figure 4), the project focused on the 
requirements of the proposed simulation application. The system uses information about 
the available FUWS component architecture, information about the environment, and 
information about the intended mission employment to provide an optimized deployment 
configuration. The system interfaces with various users including analysts, maintainers, 
and operational decision makers. 
 
Figure 4.  MFSA Context Diagram 
To keep the project efforts focused on the required system capability, the team 
developed the following high-level statement of purpose, or prime directive: 
Analyze and compare system configurations6 to inform the development 
and employment7 of distributed sensors and networked effectors in the 
undersea environment.8 
                                                 
6 Applicable Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs) are Analyze Courses of Action (OP 5.3.5) and Compare 
Courses of Action (OP 5.3.6). 
7 Applicable UJT is Tailor Forces (ST 7.1.3). 
8 Applicable Universal Naval Task is Plan Minefields (NTA 1.4.1.1). 
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This directive was useful in developing the project study questions and goals and 
in communicating the purpose of the proposed MFSA system and the required simulation 
capability. The team found the use of a prime directive statement useful in focusing 
project efforts and minimizing distractions outside the MFSA scope. By mapping the 
prime directive to appropriate joint and service tasks, the team ensured traceability and 
alignment with stakeholder organizational goals.   
2. Study Questions 
The following study questions were used to guide the project efforts: 
1. What capabilities does a networked sensor-weapon system provide over 
the existing legacy mine capability? 
2. What emergent behavior results from modular networks of sensors and 
weapons? 
3. What are the necessary sequences of events that must be modeled in a 
FUWS architecture to simulate mission scenarios? 
4. What parts, if any, of existing models or simulation systems for undersea 
warfare could be reused or integrated into MFSA? 
3. Goals and Objectives 
The following project team goals and objectives were used to scope project 
stakeholder expectations and define the anticipated project end state. They represent the 
level of MFSA development the team anticipated available resources could support.  
1. Apply Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles to the 
development of the MFSA architecture conceptual design. 
2. Identify requirements for the MFSA conceptual architecture. 
3. Develop model(s) that represent the sequence of targeting and decision 
events in a mining scenario from sensing the presence of a vessel to 
engaging a threat. 
4. Develop a prototype simulation system to demonstrate the conceptual 
architecture and to support requirement discovery. 
5. Investigate which measures of effectiveness are most applicable for 
evaluating advanced undersea weapons systems. 
 10 
4. Assumptions & Constraints 
The following assumptions and constraints were explicitly identified in the 
scoping of the project: 
1. The SEA17B AUWS concept is just one possible instantiation of a future 
system. MFSA must be applicable to other potential systems as well. 
2. All data required as inputs for the decision support system already exists 
and is accessible by government personnel and/or systems with proper 
security clearances. 
3. Current commercial-off-the-shelf desktop computers provide sufficient 
computational processing power for use by the decision support system. 
4. The consideration of potential future weapon system components can be 
limited to currently fielded technologies and to technologies that can be 
realistically fielded within the next 10 years.   
5. The MFSA requirement development process would remain solution 
neutral. While the MFSA capability may be affordability implemented by 
upgrading or modifying an existing system, the project would not assume 
this. 
6. The development of a demonstration system would be constrained by the 
team’s limited resources, including limited software programming 
experience. 
E. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY  
By clearly articulating the value of networked sensor-weapon system over the 
existing legacy capabilities, this project enhanced the Navy’s knowledge of persistent 
undersea warfare. This section describes the approach and methodology that the project 
team took as a means to accomplish the goals, meet the objectives and achieve the 
desired benefits of the project.  
1. Project Process 
Figure 5 shows the simulation system development process used by the Mental 
Focus team.   
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Figure 5.  Project Process Map (adapted from Heath et al. 2009) 
Adapted from process maps used for simulation system development, this process 
highlights the steps conducted as part of this project. With limited project resources, the 
team chose to focus on development of system requirements and supporting conceptual 
model. This report provides documentation of the project team’s efforts and is provided 
to support execution of the remainder of the development process. 
 12 
2. Team Organization 
The Mental Focus project team was composed of four Naval Postgraduate School 
graduate students, identified in Table 1, guided by two faculty advisors. The team 
included members of diverse backgrounds, but all with experience in the development 
and application of naval warfare systems. The team also had significant background 
experience and interest in the undersea domain. 










Assistant Program Manager, Mine Warfare Program 





BS NAME ‘12 
Naval Architect for the Structural Criteria and Risk 
Assessment Branch, Naval Surface Warfare Center, 





BBA Econ ‘10 
Program Analyst providing contractor support to 
Submarine Mast Mechanical System ISEA at Naval 






Submarine Warfare officer assigned to the Joint Staff 
J8 as an analyst supporting the Force Support 
Functional Capabilities Board 
 
 
In order to provide structure and accountability, specific team roles and 
responsibilities were identified for each team member, shown in Table 2, as part of the 
project planning process. These team assignments were selected to leverage individual 
expertise and skills as well as team member interests. To ensure equitable participation 
with the small team size, each team member also participated in every aspect of the 
project development and execution. 
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Coordinated system architecture design and development 




Team Lead Conducted team meetings 
Tracked project deliverables and schedule progress 
Updated and liaised with stakeholders and advisors 






Selected Modeling and Simulation tools and methods 







Coordinated final editing and submitted team reports 
Programmed prototype simulation system 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
Early in the project, the team conducted a thorough literature review focused on 
establishing a baseline understanding of the current strategic, programmatic, and 
academic efforts in development of persistent, distributed undersea weapon systems. The 
project team also reviewed the modeling and theory of wide-area sensor networks and 
targeting-decision logic. These reviews of prior work helped establish the project team’s 
subject matter knowledge base and ensured the relevance of the project goals to current 
efforts.  
While many of the sources reviewed are included in the list of references, the 
project team felt it beneficial to highlight the following sources, as they contributed 
significantly to the MFSA development: 
• Emmersen, Tracy, Ng Kiang Chuan, David Chiam, Ong Zi Xuan, Perh Hong Yih 
Daniel, Koh Wee Yung, Wes Wessner, et al. 2011. “Advanced Undersea  
Warfare Systems.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/6959. 
This Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems Engineering capstone project 
focused on design of an advanced undersea warfare system architecture, shaping 
much of the current AUWS developmental efforts. The functional decompositions 
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and dendritic models provided useful architectures for understanding the AUWS 
concept. Mental Focus built on this project by modeling combinations of sensors 
and actors (weapons). Specifically, MFSA provides the tool necessary to optimize 
the system architecture (69–70) for a variety of design reference missions 
(DRMs). 
• Bard, William. 2013. “Naval Minefield Modeling and Simulation: An 
Examination of General Analytical Minefield Tool (GAMET) and Other 
Minefield Models.” Naval Postgraduate School.  
This NPS Operations Research master’s thesis examined a government off-the-
shelf (GOTS) tool for calculation of minefield system effectiveness. William 
Bard’s thesis provided a valuable source for the team’s understanding of current 
minefield simulation capabilities. His description of functionality and capability 
of GAMET (17–22) provided a foundation for much of the project’s capability 
gap analysis and capability development efforts. 
4. Methods 
The project team recognized that successful development of the MFSA system 
would involve not only general systems engineering (SE) practices, but also Model-
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and software engineering methodologies. As shown 
in Figure 6, the successful conceptual design development of MFSA was accomplished 
using an integrated interdisciplinary approach. The methodologies and approaches 
leveraged from each discipline are shown in Table 3. The selected methods support a 
holistic evolutionary process model for MFSA software development. The team’s early 
inclusion of software engineering methods, including the development of a prototype 
system to support refinement of requirements, was intended to support rapid transition to 
MFSA development. Within the talents and resources available to the team, the team 
developed a demonstration prototype, simulating the first sprint in a scrum development 
effort (Pressman 2015, 79). 
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Table 3.   Methods Employed by the Mental Focus Project 
Discipline Method 
SE Consultations with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to understand 
stakeholders needs and concerns 
 
SE Determination of Key Performance Parameter (KPP) requirements  
 
SE Determination of the evaluation and extension of the Measures of 
Performance (MOP) of a FUWS 
 
SE Performance of a Quality Function Deployment (QFD) analysis to 
select the prototype simulation platform 
 
MBSE Determination of MFSA system architecture and targeting logic 
requirements using MBSE principles 
 
MBSE Development of a conceptual system architecture expressed in 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) and DOD Architecture 













Figure 6.  Integrated Interdisciplinary Approach to MFSA Development 
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II. CAPABILITY GAP ANALYSIS 
Mining is: … In naval mine warfare, an explosive device laid in the water 
with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring shipping 
from entering an area. The term does not include devices attached to the 
bottoms of ships or to harbor installations by personnel operating 
underwater, nor does it include devices that explode immediately on 
expiration of a predetermined time after laying. (UJTL 2015, TA 1.4) 
This chapter presents the Mental Focus team’s analysis of the system need. The 
team identified and categorized capability stakeholders to ensure the needs of the 
customer informed the team’s perspective on capability requirements. The team then 
scoped the requirements for modeling potential FUWS architectures by conducting a 
review of potential architectures. Finally, the team scoped the capability gap MFSA 
attempts to close by identifying the shortfalls in current simulation systems. 
A. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
The Mental Focus team identified a number of active stakeholders, those that 
would have a direct interest in the team’s project, and passive stakeholders, those that 
would have interest in the future development of the proposed system. These 
stakeholders, shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively, were initially identified during the 
proposal development phase to assist the team in identifying the customer need for 
FUWS simulation capabilities. Their roles and anticipated concern or interest with the 
proposed capability development were further refined during the project stakeholder 
analysis. 
The Mental Focus team identified four active stakeholder organizations that 
formed the principal customer base for the MFSA project. The missions and viewpoints 
of these organizations, as articulated in Table 4, were considered throughout the project 
execution. These organizations are all actively involved in the research and development 
of AUWS, and have established much of the critical background information necessary 
for the teams understanding of future mining capabilities. Additionally, as the NPS 
Expeditionary and Mine Warfare Adviser, Rear Admiral (ret) Rick Williams was able to 
validate the MFSA capability gap and problem statement. 
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Table 4.   Active MFSA Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Roles and Anticipated Concerns 
Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) 
Project Customer: Needs to understand capability and 
performance of various FUWS concepts in a range of missions 
and environments 
 
Concerned with technological challenges and development of 
next generation naval weapon systems 
 








Identified as MFSA system developer end user organization  
 
Project Customer: Needs to understand capability and 
performance requirements of various FUWS concepts in a 
range of missions and environments 
 
Concerned with efficient use of resources to support the 
research, development, acquisition, and modernization of naval 
weapon system capabilities 
 




Identified as MFSA operational planner end user organization  
 
Project Customer: Articulates mine warfare capabilities 
requirements; promotes rapid delivery of new technologies; 
provides minefield planning capabilities to operational forces 
 
Concerned with operational employment of mine warfare 





Project Governance: Ensures project meets standards of 
academic excellence 
 




The team also identified a number of passive stakeholder organizations with 
future roles in the development and employment of MFSA. The missions and viewpoints 
of these stakeholders, identified in Table 5, were also considered throughout the project 
execution. While not directly involved as the system customers, their role in resourcing 
and integrating the MFSA system and in implementing recommended FUWS concepts 
will be critical to the ultimate goal of improving warfighter combat effectiveness. During 
MFSA development, these stakeholders were considered primarily from their role in the 
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development and delivery of a FUWS informed by MFSA. Their interests and concerns 
were used to validate the MFSA output requirements. 
Table 5.   Passive MFSA Stakeholders 




FUWS Governance: Validates joint weapon system 
requirements 
 
Interested in efforts to exploit autonomy in the development of 
future weapon systems 
 
Concerned with risk to mission and affordability 
 
OPNAV N9/N95 FUWS Governance: Manages system requirements of naval 
warfare systems and assigns resources for system capability 
development and maintenance 
 




FUWS Influencer: Leads efforts to sustain advantages in 
undersea warfare 
 




FUWS Provider: Builds and delivers undersea weapon systems 
 
Concerned with solution development and profitability 
 
Joint Force Maritime 
Component 
Commander 
(JFMCC) and Staff 
FUWS Integrator: Establishes undersea warfare goals and 
priorities 
 
Concerned with the ability to project power from the Sea and 





FUWS Integrator: Directs use of undersea systems in the 
operational theater 
 
Concerned with flexibility, mission effectiveness, and 




B. FUWS ARCHITECTURE REVIEW 
The greatest warfighting return will be generated by proper investment in 
future USW9 payloads. The attributes that will provide that return are 
endurance and autonomy. (emphasis added, Connor 2013) 
To support the required simulation of future mining systems, the Mental Focus 
team needed to understand the key elements of an advanced mining architecture. To this 
end, the team extensively leveraged the SEA17B NPS capstone project, “Advanced 
Undersea Weapons System” (Emmersen et al., 2011). In comparison with the ONR 
AUWS architecture under development, the SEA17B architecture provides a more 
academic, solution neutral architecture at the unclassified level. As such, the project team 
used the SEA17B architecture as the foundation for a robust, accessible FUWS 
architecture at an appropriate level of abstraction to support MFSA requirement analysis.  
1. Functional Context 
Consistent with the project’s scope and operational concept (Figure 3), the Mental 
Focus team used the FUWS functional context to describe the level of abstraction 
required for modeling by the MFSA system. Specifically, in order to inform development 
priorities and predict operational effectiveness, MFSA must model the FUWS functional 
behavior as well as the relevant energy, material and information (EMI) interfaces. 
Modeling at a less detailed level of abstraction, such as the inclusion of FUWS 
capabilities in a campaign level model, or at more detailed levels, such as the physics 
modeling of hydro-acoustic transmission, would be outside the identified capability gap 
and intended MFSA scope.   
As seen in Figure 7, the functional context established by SEA17B used four 
principal groupings of EMI interfaces. 
• Controllable Inputs: those inputs and triggers that can be controlled either by the 
system developer or operational user. 
• Uncontrollable Inputs: those inputs and triggers that are part of the undersea 
environment or are controlled by the enemy. 
                                                 
9 In U.S. Navy Doctrine undersea warfare (USW) includes mine warfare, submarine warfare, and anti-
submarine warfare. 
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• Intended Outputs:  those outputs required by the operational user and designed by 
the system developer. 
• Byproducts: those emergent outputs resulting from the system behavior that must 
be mitigated (undesirable to the customer) or could exploited (desirable to the 
customer).  
 
Figure 7.  FUWS Functional Context (adapted from SEA17B 2011) 
These inputs and outputs, and the associated EMI interfaces, were reviewed by 
the team and considered for modeling in MFSA. Those inputs required to support the 
FUWS targeting logic and those outputs required to support identified measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) were prioritized for modeling in MFSA as detailed in Chapter III. 
The remaining inputs, outputs, and byproducts should be considered in enhancing the 
MFSA utility, but they were not considered as customer requirements based on the 
identified stakeholders. 
2. Functional Architecture 
Having bounded the modeling problem with the FUWS functional context, the 
team needed to understand and define the functional behavior occurring within the 
FUWS system boundary. Again, by leveraging the SEA17B project’s functional 
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decomposition, the Mental Focus team was able was able to develop a solid 
understanding of the required functional flow of a FUWS. Figure 8 provides the SEA17B 
Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram (EEFBD) showing the high level, 
architectural functions performed by FUWS. Of note, the system is responsible for 
performing a variety of functions simultaneously, independent of the presence of a threat. 
 
Figure 8.  FUWS High Level EFFBD (adapted from SEA17B 2011) 
The Mental Focus team also conducted a parallel review of the Universal Joint 
Task List (UJTL) and Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) to establish traceability of 
FUWS capabilities to mission requirements (Appendix A). As a result of this review, the 
team identified the top-level functional requirement of a FUWS as Naval Tactical Task 
(NTA) 1.4, Conduct Counter-mobility. When decomposing “Conduct FUWS operations” 
in light of this tie to counter-mobility, the team generated an alternative top-level 
functional architecture (Figure 9) focused on describing the functions required to conduct 
counter-mobility. In this decomposition, the FUWS collects information from the 
environment and threat, the uncontrollable inputs of the functional context. This 
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information then feeds the execution of internal command and control functions as well 
as possible coordination with external systems. The rule sets that drive these command, 
control and communication functions are based on the controllable inputs in functional 
context. When the predetermined engagement logic directs, the FUWS engages a threat 
to limit its mobility on or below the sea. The loops in this decomposition show the highly 
iterative nature of the system’s operational activities. Because it focused on decomposing 
the military task to demonstrate the system’s functionality, the team adopted this 
alternative functional decomposition for use in MFSA modeling.   
 
Figure 9.  FUWS Conduct Counter-mobility EFFBD 
3. Functional Allocation  
With the modified understanding of the FUWS functional decomposition, the 
Mental Focus team proceeded to examine the functional allocation to component 
subsystems at the top-level architecture. These subsystems and their interactions will 
form the basis for modeling in MFSA. 
As seen in Figure 10, the SEA17B project identified three top-level subsystems. 
These subsystems can be mapped to the functions identified in Figure 9 and were 
accepted by the Mental Focus team as an appropriate physical decomposition of a generic 
FUWS, suitable for modeling in MFSA.    
 24 
 
Figure 10.  FUWS High Level Decomposition 
In order to understand the functional limitations of each subsystem, the SEA17B 
cohort decomposed these subsystems into technologies based on the physical phenomena 
exploited in various solution sets. The Mental Focus team began with the SEA17B 
decomposition, but winnowed down the list of technologies considered based on those 
with to the greatest congruence with mission requirements and highest technological 
readiness. The challenges and opportunities associated with each of these technologies 
must be considered by MFSA   
a. Sensors 
The FUWS sensors must be capable of collecting information from the threat 
transmitted through the undersea environment. These sensors must leverage phenomena 
that could be used to detect and classify the presence of a threat. The Mental Focus team 
assessed that acoustic (both passive and active), magnetic, pressure and seismic sensors 
(Figure 11) provided the most mature technologies and most realistic sensor sets for use 
the FUWS. As such, their employment in sensor network(s) must be capable of modeling 
by MFSA. The team considered the use of optical sensors but considered the ranges 
associated with the transmission of photic energy through seawater as limiting and 
excluded optical sensors from the MFSA requirement.  
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Figure 11.  Possible FUWS Sensor Technologies (adapted from SEA17B 
2011) 
b. Communicators 
The FUWS communicators must be capable of transmitting data through the 
undersea environment from the sensors to the weapons. Additionally, because the 
command and control functions used to make engagement decisions must happen 
between the sensor and weapon, these functions were assigned to the communicators. 
The limiting technological challenge of transmitting data through the undersea 
environment was used to categorize the possible communicator technologies (Figure 12).   
The Mental Focus team assessed that acoustic (digital and analogue) and radio 
buoy (line-of-sight and satellite relay) communications provided the most mature 
technologies and realistic communicators. The team also considered the possible 
introduction of future laser communications as a possible solution based on Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Tactical Relay Information Network 
(TRITON) efforts in developing undersea blue laser communications. Finally, the team 
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included connected communications (fiber-optic and conductive wire) as a possible 
solution, particularly in protective mining scenarios. The team excluded physical 
messengers from consideration based on the speed of communications required to engage 
moving targets and the energy required for supersonic undersea transit.   
 
Figure 12.  Possible FUWS Communicator Technologies (adapted from 
SEA17B 2011) 
c. Weapons 
FUWS weapons must be capable of intercepting and limiting the mobility of an 
identified threat, using information passed by the communicators. Possible weapon 
categories broadly include kinetic and non-kinetic. Kinetic weapons rely on physical 
force, normally associated with an explosive blast, to damage the target. These weapons 
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include both fixed (similar to current mines) and mobile (similar to current torpedoes) 
explosive charges. The alternative kinetic weapons in the SEA17B decomposition are 
indistinguishable from these broad categories. For example, the embedded warhead in an 
undersea vehicle is effectively a slow speed torpedo. Non-kinetic options, identified as 
soft kill weapons in the SEA17B decomposition, would include alternative mechanisms, 
such as use of the electro-magnetic spectrum, to disable threats and counter their 
movement through the mined area. The revised categorical decomposition of possible 
weapon classifications is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Possible FUWS Weapon Classifications (adapted from SEA17B 
2011) 
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C. EXISTING CAPABILITY REVIEW 
The Mental Focus team leveraged William Bard’s NPS thesis, “Naval Minefield 
Modeling and Simulation: An Examination of General Analytical Minefield Evaluation 
Tool (GAMET) and other Minefield Models,” as an analysis of alternatives of current 
minefield simulation capabilities. Bard concludes that GAMET provides the most 
effective and capable system currently available for future mining concepts such as 
FUWS (2013, 53–54). The team accepted this conclusion, limiting the team’s review of 
existing capability to the GAMET system.  
GAMET provides “an object-oriented, event-driven simulation used in the 
evaluation of minefield effectiveness, system performance trade-offs and transitor 
vulnerability” (Belton 2015, 2). It was initially developed in 1998, predating the 
development of the AUWS concept. While subsequent GAMET version releases have 
incorporated some ability to simulate a “networked field of cooperative sensor, relays and 
remote weapons” (Belton 2015, 4), the capability provided by GAMET remains limited 
and incomplete. MFSA will address these gaps. Additionally, because of GAMET’s 
established pedigree, the team identified a number of GAMET system components that 
could be incorporated in an evolutionary development of MFSA. Chapter V.D provides 
more details. 
1. Output Limitations 
Perhaps its most significant limitation is the paucity of outputs generated by 
GAMET, specifically the limited types of minefield MOPs. GAMET is capable of 
predicting two types of MOPs for a given scenario simulation, the simple initial threat 
(SIT) and the expected casualties (EC). The SIT is an estimate of the threat presented by 
the minefield to the first transiting target vessel, expressed as the probability that the 
threat is prevented from transiting the minefield. The EC is the expected value (mean) 
number of target vessels prevented from transiting the minefield in a given scenario 
(Belton 2015, 16).  
While these simple MOEs may be adequate for comparison of legacy, explode-in-
place, minefield configurations they fail to adequately highlight the potential emergent 
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capabilities of a networked and mobile FUWS architecture. For example, the decay 
profile of the minefield threat presented to the nth target vessel could vary dramatically 
between a legacy minefield and various FUWS architectures. Without understanding this 
risk profile, the system developers will not understand the impacts of trade space in a 
FUWS architecture and operational planners will not properly optimize the employment 
of FUWS capabilities.  
This lack of a more robust set of MOEs is indicative of an enterprise-wide 
shortfall in doctrinal minefield MOEs. Given the demonstrated lack of attention to 
mining capability development, this may not be particularly surprising. However, with 
the current resurgence of interest in mining capabilities and development work on 
AUWS, relevant MOEs for distributed, networked minefields must be developed to 
support comparative analysis. Simulation systems must be capable of predicting these 
MOEs to support optimal system development and employment. To support this effort 
and define relevant MFSA output requirements, the project team developed a number of 
proposed FUWS MOEs (see Chapter III.C.3). MFSA must be capable of outputting new 
MOEs identified as relevant in the development and employment of FUWS architectures.  
2. Architecture Limitations 
The upgrades to GAMET that enable simulation of FUWS only allow for limited 
FUWS architectures. Specifically, the upgrades were biased toward modeling sensors and 
communicators and less focused on modeling enhanced weapon components. For 
instance, while GAMET allows the system user to mix different communicators (modem 
types) in a scenario, the user may only use a single weapon type in the scenario and the 
system does not simulate different characteristics associated with various weapon types 
(Belton 2015, 7). Additionally, GAMET does not consider many of the probabilities 
involved in the effective engagement of the target by a weapon. Instead it uses a single 
probability, probability of fire (PF), to determine the outcome of an engagement. While 
this simplistic approach may have been effective for an explode-in-place architecture, it 
leaves significant gaps in the ability to understand and compare the performance of 
various weapons, including mixes of weapons, and targeting logics in an advanced 
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FUWS. MFSA must be capable of modeling multiple weapon types and configurations of 
mixed weapons types with a number of targeting logics.   
3. Scenario Limitations 
GAMET employs a simple, one-at-a-time transit of target vessels in the 
simulation. While this may be adequate for legacy minefields, it does not provide users 
with an understanding of the complicating impacts on targeting logic associated with the 
presence of multiple target vessels. Simply put, when evaluating a mobile weapon such 
as a torpedo it is important to consider other vessels in the same vicinity. MFSA must be 
capable of modeling scenarios in which multiple target vessels are simultaneously 
transiting the minefield.  
4. Usability Limitations 
Finally, the current version of GAMET is a complex software tool suitable for use 
by trained analysts, but not necessarily by operational planners. In fact, the “GAMET 
User’s Guide” directs users to partner or consult with GAMET developers when building 
a scenario. The GAMET architecture requires users to provide formatted parameter data 
in at least nine different input files. The data input formats are so cumbersome, the User’s 
Guide recommends copying and editing sample sets of data to minimize input errors 
(Belton 2015, 1–3). As a result, users trained in a NPS project criticized the cumbersome 
user interface (Bard 2013, 22). MFSA must be capable of broad acceptance by the 
operational planning and program analyst user communities by providing a flexible and 
intuitive user interface.  
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III. REQUIREMENT IDENTIFICATION 
In our approach, “requirements” and “interface definitions” are treated in 
the same way using common semantics. This is because the two are 
intimately linked and quite often viewed as the same because they both 
represent binding contracts. Requirements are a contract between a 
developer and those stakeholders that interact with the developer. 
Interfaces enable communication and interaction between elements within 
a system as well as between the system and its environment. In the interest 
of simplification, we employ the term “requirements” from this point on as 
short for both requirements and interface definitions. (Madni and Sievers 
2014, 43) 
This chapter presents the Mental Focus team’s approach to requirement discovery 
by identifying the MFSA functional interfaces and articulating the information exchanges 
at these interfaces. Using a discovery process of UML use case identification and 
elaboration (Pressman 2015, 173), the team further decomposed these requirements. This 
process of information exchanges informed the development of the system architecture 
requirements described in future sections. 
A. USER CLASSES  
The team began by analyzing the active stakeholders (Chapter II, Table 4) and 
their associated information needs. The team identified four classes of users that would 
interact with the system and require system interfaces. Shown in Figure 14, these user 
classes are grouped into two principal categories: customers of MFSA outputs and 
providers of MFSA inputs. These different perspectives on the MFSA and the users’ 
interactions with it assisted the team in the development of a flexible architecture that 
addressed multiple stakeholder needs. 
1. Program Analyst  
The Program Analyst user class includes both the acquisition professional, 
concerned with cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs of various available 
technologies, and the system development engineer, concerned with how different 
component characteristics affect overall system performance. For example, an analyst 
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may want to quickly perform a parametric study to see which variables produce the 
optimal results or the analyst may want to run a series of more detailed scenarios to 
supplement and mitigate the expense of live-fire testing. The program analyst will likely 
be satisfied to use generic, or representative approximations of operational environments 
with detailed descriptions of the weapon system and threat. Ultimately the analyst is 
interested in “what is possible in the future” with a FUWS and “what is the optimal 
allocation of resources” to support the procurement of a future FUWS system acquisition 
or upgrade. The team envisions that this class of user encompasses users from NAVSEA, 
including the component program offices and warfare development centers.  
 
Figure 14.  User Class Diagram 
2. Operational Planner 
The second intended user class consists of Operational Planners, and represents 
the warfighter applicability of MFSA. These users are planning and providing military 
capabilities to operational commanders, within defined mission constraints. They are 
interested is ensuring that assigned resources and available FUWS components are 
arranged to provide the required capability. These users will likely desire to use the best 
environmental data available to predict performance in a specific tactical scenario. While 
the operational planner may coordinate with developers in the refinement of future 
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FUWS requirements, the operational planner is principally concerned with “what is 
possible with FUWS assets currently available.”   
The design approach proposed by the Mental Focus team assumes the operational 
planner has an informed technical background and is familiar with both the employment 
of undersea weapon systems and the dynamics of the undersea environment. The team 
envisions that this class of user encompasses users from operational commands, such as 
Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders, and reach-back planning support 
commands such as the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center 
(SMWDC). 
3. System Administrator 
The team added a third user class, the system administrators, whose role is 
providing and maintaining the required input information. While in practice a system 
developer or operational planner may also be a system administrator, the team 
determined that establishing a separate role for the responsibility of maintaining input 
data libraries would simplify the behavioral modeling of MFSA interactions with users. It 
would also assist the team in subsequent analysis and discovery of sustainment and 
maintenance requirements. 
The system administrator role would also include system maintainers and the in-
service engineering agent (ISEA), who maintains configuration control and validation 
authority over the data being supplied to the MFSA system. 
4. Authoritative Databases 
Finally, the Mental Focus team recognized the need for MFSA to pull data from 
authoritative databases of information, either via the system developer or via direct 
interface. Databases of environmental, threat, weapon and sensor data exist and are 
maintained by numerous offices in numerous formats. It would be impractical for MFSA 
to compile and maintain a single central database from all these various sources, thus 
individual MFSA installations would need to be capable of tracing the pedigree of data 
input streams in order to support user confidence in simulation outputs. In an ideal 
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architecture, MFSA would be capable of interfacing directly with authoritative databases 
to ensure the most current and accurate information is used in the simulation.  
B. MFSA INPUTS AND OUTPUTS  
The Mental Focus team next analyzed the customer stakeholder concerns 
(Chapter II, Table 4) and associated information needs to establish high-level groupings 
of system output and input requirements. As seen in Figure 15, and further articulated in 
Table 6, the team identified two top-level groupings of functional outputs and four 
groupings of inputs.   
 
Figure 15.  MFSA Functional Inputs and Outputs 
Next, the team translated these concerns and needs into the high level MFSA 
output requirements provided in Table 6 (Req.2.1 and Req.2.2). Starting from these high-
level functional output requirements, the team derived categories of data inputs required 
to calculate the required outputs. In addition to data about the FUWS, the team identified 
a need for information about the target, the environment, and the goals of the operational 
commander as MFSA inputs. These categories of data are summarized in the high level 
MFSA input requirements in Table 6 (Req.1.1 thru Req.1.4).   
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Table 6.   MFSA Functional Input-Output Requirements 
Requirement Threshold Objective 
Req.1.1 
MFSA shall simulate future weapon 
systems by using data representing the 
performance of undersea sensors, kinetic 
and non-kinetic effectors, associated 








technologies at or 
above TRL 5 
Req.1.2 
MFSA shall simulate exchange of EMI 
in the undersea environment by using 
data describing the environmental 









MFSA shall simulate targets operating 
in the area of concern by using data on 
target physical parameters, signal 









and neutral vessels 
Req.1.4 
MFSA shall simulate various mission 












MFSA shall calculate and predict 
measures of effectiveness and 














MFSA shall calculate and propose the 
number, type and placement of sensors, 
effectors and/or command and control 
(C2) nodes required to achieve either a 
desired effectiveness or the optimal 













In each case the proposed threshold and objective levels of performance describe 
the team’s analysis of the stakeholder’s needs and wants. Understanding the MFSA 
output capabilities are a function of the inputs captured, the team focused its energy on 
decomposing the input requirements in Table 6 using use cases and scenario narratives. 
C. COMMON USE CASES 
The identified input and output requirements were validated using Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) use case. Figure 16 shows the primary actors interfacing 
with the system and the use cases (Pressman 2015, 875) that describe the intended use of 
the proposed MFSA system, guide the development of requirements models, and support 
requirement discovery. 
 
Figure 16.  MFSA Use Cases 
Note the parallel paths and overlaps shown in Figure 16 between the FUWS 
program analyst and operational planner user experiences. While both of these classes of 
users are concerned with using MFSA to obtain decision support information, they have 
slightly different information needs. The analyst desires to understand the trade space 
between various FUWS technical parameters; the operational planner requires the ability 
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to assemble and predict the performance of a specific configuration of FUWS 
components to provide a military capability.   
1. Use Case: Configure Scenario 
In this use case, the user logs into MFSA with the tools and options configured for 
the anticipated set of tasks performed by that user. After logging in, the user first 
configures a scenario. To do this, the user may either create a new scenario or to select a 
previously scenario from a database and continue analysis. When selecting a new 
scenario, the user defines the environment in which the FUWS will operate (Req.1.2), the 
target the FUWS will counter (Req.1.3), and the operational commander’s mission or 
objective (Req.1.4). 
To define the environment, the user is presented with a choice: create a user-
defined environment, import environmental data from an external database or library, or 
load an existing environment from a database of previously saved work. When 
developing a user-defined scenario, MFSA will provide the user with an indication of the 
model maturity level as well as identify the minimum required input parameters. The 
team anticipates the minimum environmental requirements include geographic 
boundaries and water depth data. Table 7 provides a decomposition of Req.1.2 into a list 
of potential environmental parameters that may be utilized by MFSA to provide higher 
levels of simulation resolution. Appendix C provides additional details on the functional 
purpose of these parameters within the MFSA simulation process. 
As seen in Table 7, the team envisioned three levels of simulation resolution 
(basic, intermediate, and advanced), each requiring additional levels of input data and 
providing more detailed analysis. These resolutions provide a relative scale of MFSA 
analysis detail available based on the available input data and can assist the user in 




Table 7.   MFSA Environmental Input Parameters (Req.1.2) 
Environmental Parameter  Basic Inter Advance 
Geographic boundaries X X X 
Water depth X   
Bathymetric profile  X X 
Sound velocity profile (SVP)   X 
Current  X X 
Ambient noise level (AN)  X X 
Ambient noise frequency range   X 
Seismic background noise   X 
Bottom type / Bottom loss  X X 
Fixed obstacles (e.g., oil rig)  X X 
Probabilistic obstacles   X 
 
Following the definition of the environmental parameters, the user is prompted to 
define the target. As before, the user is presented with a choice: create a user-defined 
target, import target data from an external database or library, or load an existing target 
from a database of previously saved work. Again, MFSA will provide the user with an 
indication of the model maturity level and the minimum required input parameters. The 
team anticipates the minimum target data requirements include target course and speed, 
target acoustic and magnetic signatures, target mission, and target sequence number. 
Table 8 provides a decomposition of Req.1.3 into a list of potential target parameters that 
may be utilized by MFSA to provide higher levels of simulation resolution.  
The final step in setting up a scenario is defining the operational commander’s 
intended mission, including objectives, restraints and constraints. As before, the user is 
presented with options: create a user-defined mission or load an existing mission from a 
database of previously saved work. Table 9 provides a decomposition of Req.1.4 into a 






Table 8.   MFSA Target Input Parameters (Req.1.3) 
Target Vessel Parameter  Basic Inter Advance 
Number (1 to n) X X X 
Course X X X 
Speed X X X 
Max speed  X X 
Class/type  X X 
Target mission  X X X 
Displacement  X X 
Length  X X 
Width (Beam)  X X 
Draft  X X 
Damage susceptibility X X X 
Magnetic signature X  X 
Acoustic signature X  X 
Ship countermeasures   X 
Maneuvering tactics  X X 
Countermeasures tactics   X 
Mine hunting mission   X 
Mine sweeping mission   X 
Hull material  X X 
Target priority  X X 
 
Table 9.   MFSA Mission Input Parameters (Req.1.4) 
Mission Parameter Basic Inter Advance 
Limited Rules of Engagement   X 
Human “in loop” required   X 
Target discrimination required  X X 
 
2. Use Case: Configure FUWS 
In this use case, the user has previously logged on and configured a scenario. The 
user then configures the FUWS. The user may either load existing configuration or create 
a new configuration. When selecting a new scenario, the user defines the environment in 
which the FUWS will operate, the target it will counter, and the operational 
commander’s mission or objective (Table 10). 
After the user has constructed the scenario then next step is the construction of the 
minefield, either by manually placing the assets into the environment, or by using an 
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automation function which will apply “rules of thumb” to generate a configuration to 
meet the intended performance objectives. The user will build the FUWS architecture 
based on sensors, communication technologies, weapons and command logic from a 
database within MFSA. One of the features unique to the analyst role is the ability to 
define new components and/or modify existing components and add those to the MFSA 
database. This will allow the developer to perform system analysis to inform technology 
investments and priorities. 
Table 10.   MFSA FUWS Input Parameters (Req.1.1) 
FUWS Parameters Basic Inter Advance 
Sensors    
 Number (1 to n) X X X 
 Sensor Type X X X 
 Position X X X 
 Probability Detect v Range X X X 
 Bearing Accuracy  X X 
 Reliability  X X 
 Timing   X 
 Endurance / Power Usage   X 
Communicators    
 Range X X X 
 Data rate  X X 
 Latency  X X 
 Reliability  X X 
 Endurance / Power Usage   X 
Weapons    
 Number (1 to n) X X X 
 Weapon Type X X X 
 Position X X X 
 UUV Weapon Batteries X X X 
 Intercept Speed X X X 
 Search Speed X X X 
 Explosive power X X X 
 Range X X X 
 Endurance  X X 
 Reliability   X X 
 Weapon Search Pattern   X 
 Targeting Logic X X X 
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3. Use Case: Simulate Mission 
Upon successfully populating the model a “run simulation” button will become 
available. The user will have the option to run a single simulation or run a series of 
simulations for Monte Carlo analysis. An option to run the simulation graphically will be 
available to help the developer visualize how the system is performing in real time. This 
feature will help with tailoring the configuration or troubleshooting a simulation that does 
not produce the desired results. After the simulation completes the selected number of 
runs, a summary of the data will be provided on the screen, along with the selected 
measures of performance of Table 11. 
Table 11.   MFSA Predicted FUWS Performance Outputs (Req.2.1) 
MOP/MOE Outputs Basic Inter Advance 
Simple initial threat (SIT) X X X 
Threat profile (1 to n) X X X 
Expected time to engagement  X X 
Expected casualties X X X 
Resistance to channeling X X X 
Probability of detection (Pd) X X X 
Probability of classification (Pc)  X X 
Probability of engagement (PF)   X 
Probability of kill (Pk)  X X 
System failures  X X 
Fratricide risk   X 
Expected false engagements   X 
Expected unused ordinance   X 
 
4. Use Case: Generate Apportionment Request 
This use case assumes the completion of the “configure scenario” use case and is 
provided as an alternative to the “configure FUWS” use case. It allows the user to 
identify required operational counter-mobility effects as FUWS measures of performance 
and resource constraints. When sufficient data is available, MFSA will allow the user to 
“generate system requirements” and will provide the user with an asset configuration (or 
configurations) that provides the desired level of performance as seen in Table 12. This 
planning function provides the predictive optimization feature of MFSA and generates 
the outputs required to address Req.2.2 of Table 6. 
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Table 12.   MFSA Proposed Configuration Outputs (Req.2.2) 
FUWS Configuration Basic Inter Advance 
Optimal configuration of single asset 
classes proposed 
X X X 
Optimal configuration of mixed asset 
classes proposed 
 X X 
Efficient frontier of cost effectiveness    X 
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IV. NON-FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
Non-functional requirements provide a description of a system’s required 
characteristics that are not directly traceable to the system’s raison d’etre. While 
necessary to the accomplishment of the system’s mission, they are a consequence of the 
system’s existence. As reflected in the terminology of Stellman and Green who refer to 
them with such terms as “constraints,” “quality attributes,” and “non-behavioral 
requirements” (2005, 113); non-functional requirements are often qualitative. However, 
as seen in Figure 17, these qualitative concepts can often be mapped to proxy, 
quantitative metrics. 
 
Figure 17.  Non-Functional Requirements to Metrics (source: Budgen 1994) 
This chapter describes the non-functional requirements most relevant to MFSA 
development and describes a process by which these traits should be implemented. The 
team identified key considerations and best practices, which will lead to a quality MFSA 
product and to high end-user satisfaction. The non-functional requirements were grouped 
in two broad categories: 
• operational requirements which focus on the user experience  
• maintainability and supportability which focus on life cycle logistic support 
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A. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Usability 
If a product is to be successful, it must exhibit good usability — a 
qualitative measure of the ease and efficiency with which a human can 
employ the functions and features offered (Pressman 2015, 317) 
Usability, by definition, is subjective based on the user’s experience interacting 
with the software and thus requires user interaction early in the system life cycle to 
design and evaluate. This can be done using iterative approaches such as the spiral 
development model shown in Figure 18 (Pressman 2015, 323). To support this iterative 
approach, the team developed a prototype simulation tool, described in Chapter VI, that 
provided an interface for user validation. Additionally, based on feedback from users10 
and the design principles discussed in this section, the team developed a second interface 
mockup, discussed in Appendix I, which provides a vision of a fully operational MFSA 
graphical user interface.  
 
 
Figure 18.  Spiral Process for Interface Design (source: Pressman 2015, 324) 
Tognozzi provides a set of design principles (via Pressman 2015, 338–339), 
which can support development of software system usability. The team considered these 
                                                 
10 Team members role-played as stakeholder users when interacting with the prototype to accelerate 
the user feedback timeline within project constraints. 
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principles and selected the following six principles for articulating MFSA usability 
requirements. 
1. Flexibility.  
MFSA shall support flexible user input modes. As described in Chapter III, 
MFSA requires numerous user inputs (Req 1) to configure the FUWS components, 
construct the simulation environment, and run the simulation. In order to make the 
process less time consuming and more user-friendly, MFSA should support multiple 
input modes wherever practical to increase flexibility. As an example, the user may select 
the number of weapons in a given minefield by either dragging a slide bar to a desired 
number or by typing in the number. Having the ability to select from multiple input 
modes allows a user to choose a comfortable method.   
2. Metaphors.  
MFSA shall use a visual layout based on naval tactical systems. This technique 
provides the user with familiar visual cues to help guide the interactive process and 
understand the components in the simulation. When constructing the environmental 
conditions and boundaries of a minefield, MFSA will display a graphical representation 
of the area with bathymetry visualized using color gradients. FUWS system components 
should be represented with icons consistent with Common Warfighting Symbology 
(MIL-STD-2525B) whenever possible. The expected user community will be familiar 
with and comfortable with these metaphors (McFadden et al. 2008, iii), which will help 
enable widespread adoption.  
3. Consistency.  
MFSA shall provide a user interface consistent with the Global Command and 
Control System, Maritime (GCCS-M) interface. Unless there is a compelling reason for 
change, using patterns which are familiar to the user enhances the user experience. Using 
the GCCS-M interface pattern will provide a user experience likely to be familiar to 
operational users of the system and decision makers. This will also support integration 
with other warfare area planning tools.  
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4. Human Interface Objects. 
MFSA shall use existing object libraries to provide user interface objects. 
Implementing familiar design patterns, such as drop down menus, and sliders, will help 
make MFSA more intuitive to use, reduce learning time, and improve efficiency.  
5. Controlled Autonomy 
MFSA shall guide the user through the simulation setup and execution. The user 
must be presented with an intuitive path to constructing a functional model based on the 
inputs the user has already provided. Additionally, since the accuracy and validity of the 
results produced by MFSA relies heavily on user inputs, it is essential MFSA to provide 
immediate feedback on problems with data inputs. Where practical, it would be helpful to 
provide real-time error checking, such as: checking for typos (character in place of a 
number), logical inconsistencies (negative water depth), unit checking and conversion 
(feet to meters). 
6. Track State 
MFSA shall support tracking completed and remaining user actions. The user 
time investment in developing a scenario may be extensive. MFSA must be capable of 
allowing the user to save and return at a later time to continue development. Also, in 
support of the controlled autonomy principle above, MFSA should provide a method for 
tracking status to show which tasks have been completed and which remain. This feature 
serves two purposes; first, it informs users how far along they have progressed in the 
work flow, and it also allows users to return to where they left off should they decide to 
logout for a period of time. 
2. Reliability 
The project team evaluated the two components of reliability of greatest concern 





1. Software Reliability 
MFSA shall reliably operate reliably, conforming to user expectations for 
reliability. Software failures can be minimized by proper detailed design and testing. 
MFSA development should conform to MFSA should conform to the guidelines of IEEE 
P1633, Recommended Practice on Software Reliability. During MFSA development, 
appropriate reliability studies should be conducted to provide a suitable estimate of the 
quality of the final product.  This involves modeling performance, measuring key factors 
for reliability, and implementing improvements where possible.    
2. Database Network Reliability 
MFSA shall be capable of operating in the Joint Information Environment, 
exchanging data with a network of authoritative databases as well as capable of operating 
on shipboard local area networks. In Chapter III, the team identified the need for MFSA 
to pull data from authoritative databases of information via direct interface. Because 
MFSA may be deployed to shipboard networks, isolated from these authoritative 
databases, MFSA must be capable of operating without direct interface to these 
databases.  
3. Net Ready KPP 
MFSA shall be Net Ready compliant in accordance with CJCSI 6212.01F. The 
Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR KPP) is a required component of all Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) information system (IS) 
requirement documents. Table 13 provides a summary framework that can be used to 







Table 13.   NR KPP Summary Framework (adapted from JCIDS-M 2015, D-
E-5) 
NR KPP Attribute Attribute Details Measures 
Support to military 
operations 
Counter-Mobility/ 
Naval Mine Warfare 
Hours delay in enemy force 
movements caused by mines/ 
obstacles. 
% of enemy forces unable to 
reach their objective due to mines/ 
obstacles. 
NTA 1.4.1.1 Plan Minefields 
NTA 5.4.3.6 Coordinate 
Offensive Mining Operations 
Hours to coordinate minefield 
plan and input to mine tasking 
order. 
Planned minefield effectiveness 
achieved at > 50% SIT. 
Enter and Managed on 
network 
Joint Information Environment 
Shipboard Tactical Network 
MOP for entering network 
MOP for management in network 
Effectively Exchanges 
information  
Consumes data on environment, 
threats, and systems. 
Produces information on 
minefield plan and performance 
MOP for information exchange 
 
4. Cyber Security and Information Assurance 
MFSA shall conform to information security requirements of DoDI 8500.01E 
“Cybersecurity” and DoDI 8510.01 “Risk Management Framework for DOD Information 
Technology.” Four policy requirements of particular importance to MFSA are 
summarized below. 
1. Risk Management 
Cybersecurity threats shall be managed by a multi-tiered risk management 
approach. This process ensures risks and vulnerabilities of a system are properly 
identified, tracked, and mitigated in order to protect DOD information and assets. 
2. Operational Resilience 
Information and services are available to authorized users when required. This 
involves implementing a security posture that, whenever possible, provides the ability to 




3. Integration and Interoperability 
Requires that each IS achieve interoperability by adherence to DOD standards and 
instructions, ensuring that vulnerabilities are not introduced to a network through a weak 
node or system. 
4. Identity Assurance 
Provides assurance that only authorized users can gain access to systems and 
eliminates anonymity on networks by implementing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) as a 
means to manage user identity. 
B. MAINTAINABILITY AND SUPPORTABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
Software maintenance is the modification of a software product after 
delivery to correct faults, to improve performance or other attributes. 
(ISO/IEC 14764:2006) 
MFSA shall receive updates and patches to add functionality, support hardware 
and operating system upgrades, and correct user identified errors. While maintenance is 
generally associated with fixing defects, the MFSA conceptual design also involves 
administrative maintenance, described in Chapter III, to maintain the currency and 
accuracy of information used to describe assets and threats in the simulation 
architecture.  Thomas Pigoski suggests that roughly 80% of software maintenance efforts 
are non-corrective actions. This rather extensive effort involves adding features to 
improve functionality and user experience. As described previously, the architecture of 
the software relies on local administrators to update and maintain technical accuracy for 
specifications of simulated assets.  These administers will also implement updates and 
patches. 
MFSA shall include an interactive electronic technical manual (IETM). This 
manual represents the minimum level of supportability required and will provide the user 
with tutorials, explanations of features, and instructions for use. In addition to the static 
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help file, the team anticipates an online community of practice utilizing a secure service, 
such as Intellipedia,11 to share FUWS architectural designs and lessons learned.  
                                                 
11 Intellipedia provides a secure, online environment for collaborative data sharing by the Intelligence 
Community and Department of Defense.   
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V. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
The two architectures [functional and physical] are developed in parallel 
but with close interaction to ensure that the allocated architecture is 
meaningful when the functional and physical architectures are combined. 
(Buede 2009, 27) 
This chapter proposes a MFSA architecture, including functional and physical (or 
structural) expressions and the allocation of identified requirements to the architecture. 
While the architectures are discussed in separate sections for clarity and organization, 
development of the architectures in the Innoslate12 MBSE tool ensured the architectures 
were appropriately traceable.  
A. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
[A function is] an activity or task that the system performs to transform 
some inputs into outputs (Buede 2009, 211) 
An Action … specifies the mechanism by which inputs are transformed 
into outputs.  (LML 2013, 11) 
Using a top-down approach, the team began by decomposing the context action, 
Action.0.0 Perform MFSA Actions, into the top-level actions shown in Figure 19. The 
team proceeded to use SysML sequence diagrams to communicate system interactions 
and LML action diagrams to communicate the required system behavior.  
 
 
Figure 19.  Perform MFSA Action Diagram 
                                                 
12 Innoslate is a collaborative web based tool, developed by SPEC Innovations, that supports 
development of model based artifacts and execution of model verification simulations. Innoslate supports a 
number of architectural artifacts in both Life cycle Modeling Language (LML) and Systems Modeling 
Language (SysML). 
 52 
The first sequence of actions, shown in the top parallel of Figure 19, is 
representative of the actions taken by the user to define a scenario, simulate the scenario 
and review the results of the scenario. In parallel with these actions, the system 
administrator maintains the system. This includes pre-populating the system with the 
required information to support simulation of new FUWS technologies, alleviating the 
legacy burden on the end-user of validating and formatting data inputs.  
1. Establish FUWS Scenario  
Decomposing the first action, Action.1.0 Establish FUWS Scenario Architecture, 
the team developed a sequence diagram, Figure 20, to show the interactions required in 
the development of a FUWS Scenario. This diagram shows the user logging into MFSA, 
selecting the desired scenario type, and selecting the desired FUWS architectural 
components. Included in the selection of scenario type are options to open previous 
scenarios, template scenarios, and new blank scenarios. Once the selected scenario space 
has opened, the user selects the FUWS architectural components.   
 
 
Figure 20.  Sequence Diagram of Action 1.0 Establish FUWS Scenario 
This sequence diagram can be viewed as a LML Action Diagram, as seen in 
Figure 21. In addition to the sub-actions shown sequence diagram, the action diagram 
shows the inputs (or triggers) and outputs from each action.  
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Figure 21.  Action Diagram of Action.1.0 Establish FUWS Scenario 
The team continued with decomposing Action.1.5 Select FUWS Scenario to 
highlight the functionality of the MFSA system. The sequence diagram of Figure 22 
shows specific interactions between the user and MFSA required in defining the 
minefield environment, in specifying the FUWS assets (sensors, communicators and 
weapons) that comprise the minefield, and in integrating those assets in a selected 
configuration. The user may also select the anticipated target scenario and desired MOPs. 
Throughout the selection process, MFSA confirms that selections are both valid and 
congruent. If selection conflicts with previous selection, MFSA will inform the user of 
the conflict. 
 
Figure 22.  Sequence Diagram of Action.1.5 Select FUWS Scenario 
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By displaying Action.1.5 Select FUWS Assets as a SysML Action Diagram, the 
team was able to incorporate an OR construct to differentiate between the use of MFSA 
as an operational planning tool and a capability development tool. As shown in Figure 23, 
the user can either select Action.1.5.4 Select FUWS Assets to evaluate or maximize the 
performance of a given set of capabilities or select Action 1.5.5 Input FUWS Parameters 
to input desired performance parameters, using MFSA to generate a set of required 
components. 
 
Figure 23.  Action Diagram of Action.1.5 Select FUWS Scenario 
2. Run Minefield Simulation  
After the system collects the required inputs to establish the scenario, MFSA 
utilizes Monte Carlo simulations in Action.2.0 Run Minefield Simulation to translate these 
inputs into the desired outputs. This action, shown in Figures 24 and 25, begins when the 
user initiates the simulation. As seen in the sequence diagram the simulation uses the 
information previously selected by the user to generate data sets and calculate the 
required MOEs.  
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Figure 24.  Sequence Diagram of Action.2.0 Run Minefield Simulation 
 
Figure 25.  Action Diagram of Action.2.0 Run Minefield Simulation 
3. Review Output  
The final step in the MFSA user sequence is the Action.3.0 Review Output Action, 
decomposed in Figures 26 and 27. In this action, MFSA generates a formatted output 
report that is significant and meaningful for the user. The action is initiated by the user 
requesting the output report or automatically upon completion of the run simulation 
action. The output report module requests data from the simulation module and formats 
the data into a clear and concise report for the user. Not shown in these figures is the 
potential for the user to decide to re-perform the analysis with a modified set of inputs. 
This would represent a system-wide loop, as the user would return to Action.1.0 to make 
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the desired revisions. This looped process would continue until the user gathers all 
required data and results. 
 
Figure 26.  Sequence Diagram of Action.3.0 Review Output  
 
Figure 27.  Action Diagram of Action.3.0 Review Output 
4. Maintain MFSA  
As seen previously in Figure 19, in parallel with these tasks, MFSA must be 
maintained. This could include the system administrator updating the different MFSA 
modules to remove software bugs, providing future system usability enhancements, and 
updating databases to reflect changes in FUWS technologies, targets or environments. 
As shown in Figures 28 and 29, in Action.4.0 Maintain MFSA the system 
administrator logs into MFSA with a different login protocol from the user. This provides 
the system administrator with greater permissions to access and alter system components. 
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As the system administrator makes updates to the different modules, MFSA provides 
prompts to confirm the updates prior to allowing the administrator to promulgate updates 
to other users.  
 
Figure 28.  Sequence Diagram of Action.4.0 Maintain MFSA 
 
 
Figure 29.  Action Diagram of Action.4.0 Maintain MFSA 
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B. STRUCTURAL ARCHITECTURE 
The physical architecture provides resources for every function identified 
in the functional architecture.  (Buede 2009, 253) 
Because the MFSA system is an information system, many of the assets13 in the 
“physical” architecture are software components that perform allocated functions. As 
such, the team utilized the term “structural” to include traditional “physical” system 
architecture components as well as non-tangible, software module assets. 
1. Structural Hierarchy 
As seen in Figure 30, the MFSA asset can be decomposed into component 
software modules, the supporting MFSA software infrastructure, and the system 
administrator. The team chose to include the system administrator inside the system 
boundary because this role would be “created” as part of the system development. The 
program analysts and operational planners that compose the “user” asset are shown 
external to the system and there interactions with the system are shown in subsequent 
views of the structural architecture. Asset.2.0 FUWS Scenario Architecture Module was 
further decomposed to highlight the components of the FUWS and support traceability of 
the previously identified (Table 6 in Chapter III) input requirements.  
 
Figure 30.  Structural Hierarchy Diagram of MFSA  
                                                 
13 An Asset is an object (system, subsystem, component, or element), person, or organization that 
performs Actions (LML 2013, 11) 
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2. Class Diagram 
While useful for tracing the assignment of assets to functions in the architectural 
model, the hierarchy diagram provides limited information about the assets and their 
relationships. A Unified Modeling Language (UML) Class Diagram provides an 
appropriate mechanism for showing the required relationships between the assets and 
supports translating the conceptual modules into executable software modules. To 
develop a class diagram highlighting the interactions of the user with the system, the 
team began by identifying the attributes and operations associated with the user asset 
class. From this, the team was able to identify the required interactions with component 
MFSA system asset classes. The team proceeded to identify the required attributes and 
operations associated with each MFSA asset as shown in Figure 31.   
  
Figure 31.  MFSA User Interface Class Diagram 
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Additional class diagrams developed to describe the interactions of various assets 
in more detail are provided in Appendix D.  
C. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION 
The allocated architecture integrates the requirements decomposition with 
the functional and physical architectures (Buede 2009, 284) 
This section describes the team’s efforts to decompose top-level requirements and 
establish traceability with the actions and interfaces in the proposed architectures.  
1. Requirements Hierarchy 
A Requirement … identifies a capability, characteristic, or quality factor 
of a system that must exist for the system to have value and utility to the 
user. (LML 2013, 12) 
As part of the MFSA architecture model development, the identified requirements 
were arranged in a hierarchy, shown in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32.  MFSA Requirements Hierarchy 
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The input and output requirement identified in Chapter III are augmented by 
additional requirement discovered during the architecture development process.  
2. Requirement Allocation 
The team used SysML Requirement Diagrams to trace requirements to 
architecture elements that implement the requirements. The allocation of top-level 
requirements can be seen in Figure 33. The allocation of the decomposed requirements of 
Figure 32 is provided in Appendix E. 
  







D. SPECIFICATION MATCHING 
If specification matching points to an existing component that fits the 
needs of the current application, you can extract the component from a 
reuse library (repository) and use it in the design of a new system. 
(Pressman 2015, 312) 
As discussed in Chapter II.C, the team reviewed GAMET capabilities as part of 
the capability gap analysis. During this review, the team identified a number of 
capabilities provided by GAMET that would be appropriate for reuse in the MFSA 
architecture. The reuse of appropriate capabilities streamlines development efforts and by 
using proven solutions, potentially reduces validation and verification efforts.  
1. Dual User Modes 
GAMET employs of two user modes: Analysis Mode and Planning Mode. In 
Analysis Mode, the user defines the number of nodes in the field in order to evaluate the 
minefield’s effectiveness.  In Planning mode the user defines the desired effectiveness 
and GAMET automatically determines the number of nodes necessary to achieve the 
effectiveness (Belton 2015, 2). The Mental Focus team re-applied this basic architecture 
of two user modes to ensure the system provided capability to both the program analyst 
and operational planner.   
2. AUWS Upgrades 
As discussed in Chapter II.C, GAMET was upgraded to provide limited AUWS 
simulation capability. To support AUWS simulation, GAMET was modified to include 
communication logic algorithms between sensor and weapon nodes. This modification 
was extended to include probabilistic determinations of successful communication and 
user selectable decision logic options (Belton 2011, 10). To support evaluation of the 
energy requirements in various AUWS configurations, GAMET was also modified to 
include energy usage parameters. GAMET accounts for total energy consumption, energy 
consumed per detection, and energy consumed per message transmission (and receipt) at 
various power levels (Belton 2011, 19). The evaluation of energy requirements directly 
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supports evaluation of FUWS design alternatives. These and other AUWS directed 
upgrades were incorporated for reuse in the MFSA concept.  
3. Graphical User Interface 
GAMET includes a graphical display that provides the user a visual 
representation of the minefield being simulated. This allows the user to visualize the 
simulation and provides increased user understanding of the capability under 
consideration. This also allows the user to capture graphics and images that can be used 
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VI. PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT 
Models attempt to represent the entities of the engineering problem 
(opportunities) and their relationships to each other and connect them to 
the proposed solution or existing mechanism that addresses the problem. 
The model used in this way is the centerpiece of MBSE. (Long and Scott 
2011, 32) 
One of the team’s goals (Section I.D.3, Goal 4) was the development of a 
prototype simulation system (included at Appendix G) that demonstrated the team’s 
solution approach. This prototype proved beneficial in developing a more thorough 
understanding of the emergent behaviors of a distributed sensor system evaluating the 
performance differences from a legacy mine system. Given the limited resources 
available, the Mental Focus team chose to execute the prototype development as the first 
demo in a scrum14 development process. To simulate this agile software development 
technique, the team conducted short semi-weekly meetings to brainstorm techniques, 
assign responsibilities, and track progress. During the second in-progress review (IPR) 
the team presented the prototype for “customer feedback” from attending faculty and 
students. In response to this feedback, the prototype was updated to incorporate 
additional outputs desired by potential users.  
A. METHODOLOGY 
A primary reason for the popularity of agent based modeling (ABM) and 
its departure from other simulation paradigms is that ABM can simulate 
and help examine organized complex systems (OCS). This means the 
ABM paradigm can represent large systems consisting of many subsystem 
interactions. (Heath et al. 2009) 
The team began the prototype development process by selecting a simulation 
environment for use. The team considered a number of programs, conducting a brief 
analysis of alternatives detailed in Appendix F, before selecting Netlogo15 for use. Unlike 
                                                 
14 Scrum is an agile software development method conceived by Jeff Sutherland in the 1990s. 
Development work is conducted in sprints that deliver demonstrations of functionality to the customer for 
evaluation (Pressman 2015, 78–79). 
15 Netlogo is a free, open-source modeling environment developed and maintained by the Center for 
Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling at Northwestern University. 
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the other programs considered, Netlogo is an agent based modeling (ABM) platform. 
While not considered in the initial selection of Netlogo, the team discovered that the 
ABM approach is well suited to the simulation of a FUWS. Model-Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE) traditionally uses architecture models to decompose and allocate 
the required system functional behaviors using various process models16 to manage the 
complexity of the design (Buede 2009, 60). In contrast, ABM, much like object orient 
programming, begins with the definition of agents or assets and their attributes. When 
providing the agents with decision-making rule sets, ABM becomes a very capable 
technique for simulating the actions and interactions of large numbers of “like” agents, 
such as the sensors and weapons in a FUWS.  
1. Notation 
Every modeling technique is a language used to represent reality so that 
some question can be answered with greater validity than could be 
obtained without the model.  (Buede 2009, 59) 
Netlogo primitive agents are grouped into four distinct agent-sets:  
1. The observer is a single agent that observes and directs the actions of 
other agents in the model. 
2. Patches are fixed background agents that form the environment on which 
other agents act. 
3. Turtles are agents that can move, interacting with both patches and other 
turtles. 
4. Links are agents that connect turtles, establishing an enduring relationship 
between two turtles 
Subsets of these primitive agent-sets can be established by creating “breeds” of 
turtles or links with custom attributes and by “asking” groups of agents about their 
parameters, including relationships with other agents. This allowed the programmer to 
                                                 
16 The Enhanced Function Flow Block Diagram (EEFBD), ICAM Definition for Function Modeling 
(IDEF0), N2 Diagram, SysML Sequence Diagram, SysML Activity Diagram, and LML Action Diagram all 
decompose functional behavior (Long and Scott 2014, 39–44) by tracing the processing of energy, matter, 
material wealth and information (EMMI) through the system. 
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develop simple, condition based behavior heuristics and apply them to large numbers of 
agents, simplifying the model development process. 
2. Scrum Backlog 
The scrum development process uses a backlog to track the user functions 
targeted for development in the sprint. To scale and prioritize the development of 
requirements identified in Chapters III and IV, the team developed the following 
simulation goals for the prototype structured using the decide, detect, deliver, assess 
(D3A) targeting methodology used by Maritime Component Commanders (JP 3–60, C-1) 
and shown in Figure 34. 
1. Decide. The prototype would allow the user to decide to employ either a 
legacy mine capability or FUWS. The simulation would support this 
decision by simulating the deployment of the selected capabilities in a 
two-dimensional counter-mobility area using selected algorithms. 
2. Detect. The prototype would simulate sensors capable of detecting the 
proximity of a hostile contact. 
3. Deliver. The prototype would simulate weapons capable of delivering 
mission kill effect. This includes simulating explode-in-place weapons in a 
legacy architecture and intercept-to-engage weapons in a FUWS 
architecture. 
4. Assess. The prototype would calculate system MOPs for assessment by 
the user. This would include, at a minimum, the SIT and threat profile. 
 
Figure 34.  D3A Targeting Methodology. 
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B. REFERENCE SCENARIO 
The team developed a simple reference scenario that could be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of counter-mobility architectures. As shown in Figure 35, hostile surface 
ships approach the western entrance of a maritime straight with the goal of transiting to a 
point east of the straight. To limit the hostile forces’ mobility, the friendly commander 
deploys a counter-mobility capability in the 10 nm by 10 nm area shown. Multiple 
surface ships will sequentially attempt to transit the area, requiring the friendly 
commander to possess a sustained counter-mobility capability.  
 
Figure 35.  Scenario Laydown 
1. Assumptions 
... it is a mistake to ascribe objectivity to models. Complex mathematical 
models have subjective assumptions throughout them. (Buede 2009, 60) 
The following assumptions were explicitly made in the development of the 
prototype model to maintain simplicity and demonstrate the selected modeling approach.  
1. Hostile contacts do not maneuver within the minefield area 
2. Sensor detections can be assumed to occur at a fixed range as opposed to a 
probabilistic function of target signal strength and sensor sensitivity 
3. Sensor false detect rate is low and can be neglected 
Land 
Land 
Hostile Surface Ship 






4. Data latency in the system is low, and can be neglected 
5. Warhead detonations within a fixed range always result in a mission kill 
with no partial damage 
With these assumptions, the model results should not be used to predict absolute 
system behavior but can be used to establish the relative behavior of the solutions under 
consideration and provide a framework for further development and refinement. The 
chosen modeling environment is robust enough to support reducing these assumptions 
and increasing the accuracy of the model in subsequent sprints. 
2. Conceptual Model 
ABM begins with assumptions about agents and their interactions and then 
uses computer simulation to generate “histories” that can reveal the 
dynamic consequences of these assumptions. Thus, ABM researchers can 
investigate how large-scale effects arise from the micro-processes of 
interactions among many agents. (Axelrod and Tesfatsion 2015) 
Using a “middle out” engineering approach (Long and Scott 2011, 14), the first 
solution concept developed was the “as is” naval mine solution. Sensors within a given 
range of the hostile ship detect the ship and send a signal to the connected, collocated 
weapon to detonate. If the detonation occurs within the blast radius of the weapon, the 
system achieves a mission kill and the hostile ship dies. 
While the “as is” mine is conceptually simple, the FUWS concept is much more 
complicated and requires more attributes for the sensors and weapons. In this conceptual 
model, a sensor network is deployed separate from a number of torpedo batteries. When a 
sensor detects a hostile ship it informs all sensors within a given communication radius 
that it has detected a threat. These sensors act as relays passing on the detection of the 
threat to additional sensors and eventually to the UUV batteries. The “next to fire” 
torpedo in the network is then aimed based on the location of the detecting sensor and a 
simplistic targeting logic, assumed hostile ship’s course and speed. Once fired, the 
torpedo loses communication with the network and attempts to gain organic contact on 
the hostile ship using a forward-looking cone of acquisition. If the torpedo “sees” the 
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ship, it will home on the ship until it reaches a range where it detonates, killing the ship. 
If the torpedo fails to “see” the ship, it will eventually run out of fuel and shutdown. 
C. COMPUTER MODEL 
There are major advantages arising from using models as the basis of 
systems engineering. (Long and Scott 2011, 65) 
To translate these conceptual models into a functional computer simulation, the 
team decomposed Asset 2.2 FUWS Assets of Chapter V.B and allocated some of the basic 
input requirements of Chapter III to the asset subclasses. To support the translation of the 
conceptual design into the Netlogo modeling environment, a UML class diagram, shown 
in Figure 36, was used to map the FUWS asset components onto the Netlogo primitive 
agents. 
 
Figure 36.  UML Class diagram of Agent Breeds and Attributes 
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1. User Interface 
The prototype computer model user interface is shown in Figure 37 with 
additional views shown in Appendix G. On the left of the screen are user-selected inputs 
to the model. The user begins by selecting the desired counter-mobility system 
architecture and tactics from the sim-type dropdown. The sim-runs input box sets the 
number of Monte-Carlo simulation run and the FixedField toggle determines if a new 
randomized undersea weapon system deployment laydown is generated between 
simulation runs. 
To model a legacy minefield, the user selects either a “radial minefield” (mines 
are laid in lines passing near the center of the counter-mobility area) or a “vertical 
minefield” (mines are laid in rows across the transit axis) from the sim-type dropdown. 
The user then selects the total quantity of mines and the number of lines in which they are 
deployed using the Undersea Weapon System Parameters slider bars, Lines and MineQty.   
To model a FUWS, the user selects fuws from the sim-type dropdown. The user 
then selects the total quantity of sensors (SensorQty), the number of lines in which the 
sensors are deployed (Lines), then number of torpedoes (MobileWeaponQty) and the 
number of batteries (UUVQty) in which the weapons are deployed using the appropriate 
Undersea Weapon System Parameters slider bars.  
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Figure 37.  Prototype Demonstration 
The user controls the setup and tactics of the threat using the Enemy Vessel 
Parameters slider bars. The t-speed slider sets the transit speed of the target vessels and t-
number sets the number of sequential vessels transiting in each simulation run. The t-
tactic drop down is used to select the tactic used by the threat vessels: direct-path 
(vessels transit directly from their random points of origin to the goal), center-line 
(vessels transit a 1ky wide path thru the center of the counter-mobility area), or edge-line 
(vessels transit a 1ky wide path randomly selected away from the center of the counter-
mobility area). 
After setting up the weapon system and threat, the user must click on the Initialize 
button to update the settings in the model and the Start-Sim button to begin the series of 
simulations. 
In the center of the screen is a graphic overview of the simulation. Sensors are 
shown as circles, weapons as exes, and threat vessels as diamonds. In the FUWS mode, 
the communications network links are shown in grey to support user visualization of the 
communications network. As the simulation runs, the user can watch the interactions of 
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the threat with the sensors and weapons, observing the effectiveness of the weapon 
system and the potential weaknesses of the system. 
On the right side of the screen are a number of output MOPs. The bar graph 
shows the calculated threat presented to each sequential transiting vessel. Point estimates 
of the simple initial threat (SIT), standard error of the SIT, and expected casualties (EC) 
are output in the monitor windows below the graph. Also shown in FUWS scenarios are 
the number of misses (torpedoes expended but that failed to hit) per simulation run. 
2. Verification and Validation  
Because the prototype simulation system was developed as a demonstration for 
communication with stakeholders, it was subjected to a limited verification and validation 
process. System verification was conducted using limited software smoke testing 
(Pressman 2015, 479) during each programming day. As new features were added, the 
simulation was debugged and executed to ensure it behaved as expected. System 
validation was conducted using a beta testing (Pressman 2015, 485) strategy with other 
members of the Mental Focus team acting as end-users.  
3. Results 
Was planned minefield effectiveness achieved at > 50% SIT? (Dept. of the 
Navy 2007, Performance Metric #2 of task NTA 5.4.3.6 Coordinate 
Offensive Mining Operations) 
The prototype simulation system was developed to demonstrate the team’s 
conceptual solution approach and support additional requirement discovery. The data in 
the system is generic and not representative of existing or planned systems. As such, the 
comparison of simulation predictions to real world performance should not be conducted 
and is outside the scope of this project. Despite these limitations, the prototype simulation 
system was useful in answering some of the team’s initial study questions.  
The standard minefield effectiveness metric in current use is the simple initial 
threat (SIT), or the probability that the first hostile ship to transit the minefield (hostile 
ship1) is killed (equation 1).  
 74 
  (1) 
Where k1 is the number of times the first hostile ship is killed and 
n is the number of scenarios run 
While operational planners currently focus on the SIT MOP, looking at how the 
minefield’s performance changes with time provides a more holistic understanding of 
system performance. By extending the concept of the threat presented by the minefield to 
the ith hostile ship (equation 2), one can develop a threat profile (T) vs. transit sequence 
number (i). 
  (2) 
Another useful metric is the expected casualties (EC) shown in equation 3. EC 
provides the warfighter with an estimate of the reduction in the enemy force, should the 
enemy attempt to transit the minefield. 
  (3) 
To highlight the value of the MFSA tool, the team used BehaviorSpace17 to 
explore the capability provided by the FUWS parameters described in Table 14 and the 
legacy mine parameters described in Table 15. By varying the parameters identified (and 
underlined) in Tables 14 and 15, the team was able to use Monte Carlo simulations of the 
systems to show the impact on capability performance. Using BehaviorSpace, the team 
conducted a “sweep” of the parameter space by conducting Monte Carlo simulations for 
twelve different implementations of both the legacy minefield and the FUWS 
architecture. The results of these scenarios were post processed in Excel and summary 
statistics are provided in Appendix H.  
 
 
                                                 
17 BehaviorSpace is a tool integrated with NetLogo that allows users to systematically vary a model’s 
parameters and explore combinations of settings.  
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Table 14.   FUWS Model Parameters 
Weapons Single speed, 45kts, torpedoes with passive 
seekers having a 45° cone of acquisition and 
detection range of 2kyds, and with blast radius of 
N(µ=200 yd, σ=12 yd) 
Weapon 
arrangement 
6 weapons distributed on 1, 2, or 3 stationary 
UUV launchers 
Sensor Networked sensors with detection range 
N(µ=200 yd, σ=25 yds) against all hostile ships 
Total Sensors 50 or 100 distributed in either 2 or 5 vertical lines 
Communicators Sensor-sensor communications ranges of 4kyds 
and sensor-UUV communication ranges of 
10kyds with negligible data latency. The 
communicators pass the geographic location of a 
detecting sensor. 
Table 15.   Legacy Mine Model Parameters 
Weapons Explode in place warheads with blast radius: 
N(µ=200 yd, σ=12 yd)  
Weapon 
arrangement 
50, 60, 70, 80, 90, or 100 mines distributed in 
either 5 or 10 “Vertical” mine lines 
Sensor Integrated sensor with detection range N(µ=200 
yd, σ=25 yd) against all hostile ships 
 
Figure 38 shows the resulting threat profile estimate for each configuration with 
FUWS data points plotted in green and legacy mine data points plotted in blue. While the 
independent variable is not time, the sequential nature of the hostile ships transiting the 
field provides a proxy that allows us to show system performance trends without focusing 
on the single system metric of SIT. The arrows show the general shape of the data series 
associated with each architecture configuration. While the legacy mines present a 
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capability that decays exponentially,18 the FUWS provides a nearly static capability that 
only begins to decay as the number of threat ships approaches the number of weapons in 
the system.19 As a result, while all the system configurations modeled begin with a SIT 
between 0.4 and 0.8, by the arrival of the third transiting vessel, the FUWS systems are 
significantly out performing legacy systems. The change in the shape of the performance 
data is significant and addresses the second study question (Chapter I). The change in the 
threat profile indicates that the FUWS will sustain its performance while weapons remain 
in the system and is an emergent property of the FUWS architecture.  
Systems thinkers use graphs of system behavior to understand trends over 
time rather than focusing attention on individual events. (Meadows and 
Wright 2008, 20) 
 
Figure 38.  Threat Profile 
                                                 
18 Fits of exponential decay curves (y=ae-bx) to of each of the legacy twelve systems resulted in an 
average R2 value of 0.987, with a minimum of 0.971, indicating that the simulation results show an 
exponential decay of capability.  
19 The best fit curve to the FUWS data was a second order polynomial (y=ax2+bx+c) with a 
“maximum” near the first or second transistor and an average R2 value of .881, with a minimum of 0.687. 





















Also of note, the team observed a strong linear relationship between the SIT and 
the components of the threat profile. As seen in Figure 39, the single parameter of SIT is 
a strong indicator for the T2. This linear relationship holds for T3 thru T6. Also, since EC 
is the sum of threat profile componets, EC could also be expressed as a function of the 
SIT (Figure 38). As such, the team began to understand the predominance of the SIT in 
current minefield planning doctrine and measure. Within the legacy architecture, the 
threat profile and EC are redundent measures to the SIT. However, when comparing the 
FUWS architecture to the legacy architecture, the SIT is not adequate to describe the 
change in capability.  
 
Figure 39.  T2 as a Function of SIT 
One can readily see from Figure 40 that using the predicted SIT to compare a 
legacy mine system to a FUWS does not adequately describe the differences in 
performance. For example, the FUWS system with a SIT of 0.42 has a predicted EC of 
2.5 ships and outperforms the legacy system with a SIT of 0.78 and an EC of 2.2 ships. 
Note that the FUWS curve is above the legacy curve, indicating a higher EC for a given 
SIT, and has a steeper slope than the legacy curve, indicating that this difference is more 
y = 0.29x - 0.09 
R² = 0.87 
y = 0.55x + 0.16 

























pronounced at higher SIT values. Since the EC is operationally relevant to the Naval 
Warfighter, translating into an expected reduction in enemy capability, the team contends 
that EC should take precedence over SIT, especially when comparing different FUWS 
architectures. 
 
Figure 40.  EC as a Function of SIT 
4. Cost Benefit Analysis 
Finally, to demonstrate the value of MFSA to program analysts, the team 
developed a rough order of magnitude life cycle cost (LCC) model (Equations 4 and 5) 
and compared the cost effectiveness of the various solutions in current year dollars 
(CY$).  
  (4) 
Where M is the number of mines deployed in the minefield 
Cprocurement is the mine procurement cost in CY$ (assumed $1,000/mine) 
Csustainment is the average mine sustainment cost in CY$  (assumed $1,000/mine) 
Crecovery is the average mine recovery cost in CY$  (assumed $10,000/mine) 
Cdisposal is the average mine disposal cost in CY$  (assumed $1,000/mine) 
ML is the number minelines and 
Cdeployment is the average cost to deploy a mineline in CY$ (assumed $10,000/line) 
y = 3.93x - 0.75 
R² = 0.96 
y = 5.21x + 0.29 




























  (5) 
Where W is the number of weapons deployed in the minefield 
Cw.procurement is the average weapon procurement cost in CY$ (assumed $100,000/weapon) 
Cw.sustainment is the average weapon sustainment cost in CY$  (assumed $1,000/weapon) 
Cw.disposal is the average weapon disposal cost in CY$ (assumed $1,000/weapon) 
UUV is the number of UUV weapon batteries deployed 
CUUV.deployment is the LCC/deployment of a UUV in CY$  (assumed $100,000/UUV) 
CUUV.recovery is the cost to recover a UUV in CY$ (assumed $10,000/UUV) 
S is the number of sensors deployed 
Cs.procurement is the average sensor procurement cost in CY$ (assumed $1,000/sensors) 
Cs.sustainment is the average sensor sustainment cost in CY$  (assumed $1,000/weapon) 
SL is then number of sensor lines and 
Cs.deployment is the average cost to deploy a sensor line in CY$ (assumed $10,000/line) 
To support subsequent analysis, the costs were then normalized to a scale of “0” 
(20% higher than the highest calculate cost) to “1” (20% lower than the lowest cost 
calculation). While very rough estimates, these cost models enabled the team to 
demonstrate the value of MFSA in an acquisition analysis of alternatives. Figure 41 
shows a plot of SIT as a function of the normalized LCC for each alternative considered. 
From the graph, one can see that the FUWS and legacy architectures provide competitive 
levels of performance at the same general cost levels; that is the alternatives from both 
architectures are clustered together. However, for a given cost, the maximum SIT 
performance, shown by the Pareto Frontier, is dominated by legacy solutions sets. 
The team also performed this analysis using EC as the discriminating 
performance parameter. As seen in Figure 42, the FUWS architecture and legacy 
architecture are no longer grouped, with the FUWS architecture providing significantly 
improved performance and dominating the Pareto Frontier. 
 80 
 
Figure 41.  SIT Performance vs Life Cycle Cost 
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Calculating a Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) score for each alternative, as shown in equation 6 using the SIT, indicates the 
“best” solutions are legacy mine solutions. The top scores are for the legacy solutions 
with 50 or 60 mines. From this we can see that traditional measures of performance 
would bias towards the legacy solution architecture. 
   (6) 
Where KPPi is either the SIT or normalized EC of the ith alternative and  
LCCi is the normalized cost of the ith alternative 
Calculating TOPSIS scores using the normalized EC indicates that FUWS 
systems provide the “best” solutions. As discussed earlier, the Mental Focus team 
considers EC a more relevant operational metric that should be considered and 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Modelers can give instructions to hundreds or thousands of “agents” all 
operating independently. This makes it possible to explore the connection 
between the micro-level behavior of individuals and the macro-level 
patterns that emerge from their interaction. (Wilensky 2015) 
The Mental Focus project team successfully developed a system architecture and 
requirements model for the development of a simulation system, consistent with the 
prime objective mission statement articulated in Chapter I: “Analyze and compare system 
configurations to inform the development and employment of distributed sensors and 
networked effectors in the undersea environment.”  By developing a prototype of the 
required simulation system, the team was able to conduct an analysis comparing the 
performance of various system configurations and validating the conceptual solution. By 
answering the study questions developed during the initial project proposal, the team was 
able to demonstrate the success of the project and identify areas for future study and 
continued development. 
A. SUMMARY OF WORK 
Simulation differs from standard deduction and induction in both its 
implementation and its goals. Simulation permits increased understanding 
of systems through controlled computational experiments. (Axelrod and 
Tesfatsion 2015) 
Using a combination of traditional Systems Engineering, Model-Based Systems 
Engineering, and Software Engineering practices, the project team analyzed stakeholder 
needs, established mission scenarios, determined functional and nonfunctional 
requirements, developed a proposed system architecture and built a demonstration model 




1. Study Question Answers 
1. What capabilities does a networked sensor-weapon system provide over 
the existing legacy mine capability? 
The team employed the demonstration model to address this question in Chapter 
VI. The team was able to show that FUWS provides a potentially significant 
improvement in EC when compared with legacy capabilities with comparable SIT 
performance metrics. While the predicted SIT was similar for both architectures, the 
FUWS minefield presented a sustained capability to subsequent transiting vessels that the 
legacy systems did not. This threat profile prevents the enemy from forcing a channel 
through the minefield with a few sacrificial ships. While counter-countermeasures, such 
as ship counting techniques, could be used to “flatten” the legacy threat profile, they do 
this by shifting the threat from the initial transiting vessel to subsequent vessels. To 
restore the SIT and achieve the EC promised by the FUWS architecture requires 
deploying significantly more mines.   
2. What emergent behavior results from modular networks of sensors and 
weapons? 
The team employed the demonstration model to address this question in Chapter 
VI. Even with the simple model used in the demonstration, the team was able to highlight 
critical system behaviors that emerge from FUWS’s distributed network of sensors and 
weapons.  The planned emergent behavior is the counter-mobility capability provided by 
the integration of sensors, communicators and weapons in the FUWS. However, the most 
significant unforeseen emergent behavior is the change in the threat profile predicted in 
Chapter VI. 
With the legacy approach, the effectiveness of the minefield decays as additional 
vessels enter the minefield. As the enemy forces a passable channel through the 
minefield, only a small fraction of the weapons are actually employed before the enemy’s 
movements are no longer restricted and the counter-mobility capability is lost. This is 
seen in the exponential decay of the threat profile as the enemy forces through the area 
(Figure 38). 
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With the FUWS approach, the effectiveness of the minefield is maintained as 
vessels enter the minefield. As the enemy attempts to force a channel through the 
minefield, a significant fraction of the deployed weapons can be brought to bear, 
regardless of the selected path. This results in a flatter, if not truly constant, threat profile. 
The team noted that a second order polynomial fit could describe the predicted threat 
profile, as the capability would begin to degrade as the number of vessels began to 
approach the number of weapons deployed. While the minefield’s predicted threat to the 
first vessel was similar in both the legacy and FUWS minefields, the predicted threat to 
subsequent vessels was significantly higher in the FUWS approach.  This threat, of 
course, begins to taper as the number of vessels approaches the number of weapons in the 
FUWS and collapses when the number of weapons is exceeded. The FUWS would need 
to be re-enforced to maintain the capability, much as a minefield would need to be re-
seeded to reestablish lost capability.  
While the demonstration prototype makes a number of simplifying assumptions, 
the team found this change in behavior and the associated improvement in predicted 
effectiveness profound enough to recommend further development of MFSA.  A more 
robust MFSA simulation system would provide a better understanding of emergent 
behaviors, support understanding of the system’s performance capabilities, and improve 
both minefield planning and the development of future minefield capabilities.  
3. What are the necessary sequences of events that must be modeled in a 
FUWS architecture to simulate mission scenarios? 
The project team chose to address this question in two ways. The team began by 
constructing use cases (Chapter III) that would assist in understanding the end-to-end 
sequence of events from data input to information output. In Chapter V, the team showed, 
using sequence diagrams, the necessary sequence of events that would be required for the 
user to define the desired FUWS architecture and operational scenario, the simulation of 
the architecture, and the output of results to the user. The team also acknowledged that 
sequence of events in the FUWS detect-to-engage sequence could be decomposed to 
various levels of complexity. As such, in Chapter III the team identified the data 
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necessary to model the FUWS architectures at basic, intermediate and advanced levels of 
complexity to support user accuracy requirements. 
The team also addressed this question by developing a demonstration prototype 
that would simulate a basic mission scenario. This aided the team in understanding the 
expected sequence of events both in the FUWS and in the MFSA simulation of the 
FUWS. The team was able to use the process of prototype system development to 
provide feedback to requirement identification efforts and assist in requirement 
discovery.  
4. What parts, if any, of existing models or simulation systems for undersea 
warfare could be reused or integrated into MFSA? 
In the early phases of this capstone effort, the project team conducted a thorough 
literature review including an examination of current advanced mining efforts as well as 
current modeling and simulation efforts. 
As described in Chapter II, the team reused components from the AUWS 
architecture models developed by the SEA17B Capstone team with minor changes and 
adaptations. The Mental Focus project team used this instantiation of a future mining 
system and generalized it to develop the FUWS concept. By leveraging the SEA17B 
capstone team’s efforts, the Mental Focus team was able focus on the development of 
MFSA. This supported for a cohesive continuation of study on the topic of unmanned 
undersea weapon systems. 
The team also identified simulation system components and elements for reuse in 
the MFSA simulation system. In Chapter V, the team discussed components of the legacy 
system, GAMET, that could be incorporated in the MFSA simulation system. These 
elements include features of the graphical user interface, the sensor and communicator 
logic parameters, and the dual user modes.  Reusing these elements allowed the team to 
focus the System Engineering efforts on other aspects of the system development. 
Ultimately, the team’s analysis of GAMET capabilities and weaknesses was instrumental 
in the development of a cohesive MFSA conceptual design. 
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2. Goals Achieved 
1. Apply Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) principles to the 
development of the MFSA architecture conceptual design. 
The project team relied heavily on MBSE in two primary lines of effort.  The first 
was the use of Innoslate to develop the architectural model described in Chapter V.  The 
second was the use of NetLogo and Agent Based Modeling to develop the prototype 
model described in Chapter VI.  The successful application of MBSE to these efforts 
enabled the accomplishment of subsequent goals.  MBSE allowed the project team to 
better examine the functionality of the system and understand the impacts of system 
elements on system requirements. 
2. Identify requirements for the MFSA conceptual architecture. 
The project team identified the functional requirements (Chapter III), non-
functional requirements (Chapter IV), and developed a conceptual architecture 
implementing these requirements (Chapter V). In the functional analysis, the team 
analyzed the purpose of the system and required outputs that would support fulfillment of 
that purpose. The team then developed a set of input requirements that would be required 
to produce the desired outputs. These inputs, described in more detail in Appendix C, 
provide the data about the system under consideration (the sensors, communicators and 
effectors that comprise the weapon system), the threat and the environment in which they 
operate. With these inputs, the simulation system can provide the user with the required 
system performance information to support alternative design and operation employment 
decisions.  
The team also conducted an analysis of non-functional requirements that would 
add value to the user experience and support the functional employment of the 
system.  Both the functional and nonfunctional requirements were utilized in the 
development of the proposed conceptual system architecture. 
3. Develop model(s) that represent the sequence of targeting and decision 
events in a mining scenario from sensing the presence of a vessel to 
engaging a threat. 
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The team used Innoslate to support the development of an architectural model of 
the proposed MFSA system as described in Chapter V.  This allowed the team to develop 
a mature, cohesive system architecture model.  Innoslate evaluates the maturity based on 
a number of pass-fail statements in five different categories: Decomposition, Traceability, 
Action Performance, Input/ Output and Connections.  
 
Figure 43.  Innoslate Model Maturity Tracker 
The process of model development and the discipline required to develop a 
mature architectural model aided the team in the discovery of the functional 
requirements. As seen in Chapter V and Appendix E, the process of developing the 
functional and structural architectures helped the team identify requirements not directly 
linked to the system inputs and outputs. 
4. Develop a prototype simulation system to demonstrate the conceptual 
architecture and to support requirement discovery. 
The project team developed a prototype simulation system in NetLogo to 
demonstrate the conceptual architecture to stakeholders and support additional 
requirement discovery. The team defined the relationships and interactions between 
sensors, communicators, weapons and the threat using NetLogo’s Agent Based Modeling 
environment. The process of prototype development also supported the requirement 
analysis in Chapters III and V and the identification of the minimum required detect-to-
engage sequence to support FUWS simulation. 
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While the team made a number of simplifying assumptions to support 
development of the prototype within available resources, the prototype was able to 
demonstrate the detect-to-engage sequence of a FUWS and calculate measures of 
effectives that could compare various FUWS solution approaches. This allowed the team 
to conduct analysis in Chapter VI comparing the performance of a legacy minefield with 
that of a FUWS, showing the effectiveness of a FUWS architectural approach and the 
potential operational and cost benefits associated with the FUWS concept. 
5. Investigate which measures of effectiveness are most applicable for 
evaluating advanced undersea weapons systems. 
The team’s initial research indicated that the mine warfare community relied 
excessively on Simple Initial Threat (SIT) measure of performance. This is seen in the 
paucity of alternative measures of performance specified for minefield planning tasks 
(Appendix B). Reviews of doctrine indicated that, while other established measures such 
as expected casualties (EC) and the threat profile were available, they were not 
emphasized in the evaluation of plans and systems.  
The team postulated that these other MOPs were under utilized and investigated 
their applicability to the FUWS concept. As seen in Chapter VI, the reliance on SIT as a 
single measure of performance is viable in the legacy architecture as the threat profile and 
EC are directly related to the SIT. However, the team also showed that these relationships 
change when the architecture is changed and that a shift in emphasis to the EC in a design 
scenario may be appropriate. 
The team recognized that a system such as MFSA has the potential to leverage the 
growth in available computing power to compute additional, potentially new, measures of 
performance and effectiveness and provide these to the user in meaningful ways. As seen 
in Appendix I, the team postulated that the minefield effectiveness is not uniform and 
varies across the minefield. Providing this information to the planner can ensure that the 
weapon system effectiveness is appropriately distributed by the placement of sensors and 
weapons. This information supports improved minefield planning and informed 
operational risk decision-making by leadership. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT 
Within the scope of this CAPSTONE effort, the team was able to transition 
MFSA into the conceptual development phase of the system life cycle. The team 
demonstrated Systems Engineering, Model-Based Systems Engineering, and Software 
Engineering techniques to describe the system context and the proposed solution system 
at a high level of abstraction. The expressed need for a MFSA system remains (Ponirakis 
2014). Further Systems Engineering efforts are necessary develop and deliver an 
operational MFSA system. The project team recommends that continued development 
efforts focus on the following three lines of effort: comparison of alternative MFSA 
system architectures, techniques to support more sophisticated FUWS targeting logic 
options, and analysis of the MFSA integration requirements with other warfare planning 
systems. These recommendations represent critical System Engineering best practices 
that were not included in the scope of this project.   
The Mental Focus team developed a single system architecture to aid in the 
conceptual understanding of the proposed software system and in the development of 
system requirements. However, this architecture was not formally evaluated and may not 
be the most successful or efficient approach. Before transitioning system development to 
the detailed design phase, a formal analysis of alternatives should be performed on 
comparative system architectures. This systems engineering analysis should use 
additional stakeholder input and priorities to develop comparative parameters for MFSA 
evaluation. 
The targeting logic used in the prototype demonstration is very simplistic. The 
FUWS modeled simply shoots a single weapon at an estimated intercept point down the 
expected axis of motion from a detecting sensor. Improvements in the sophistication of 
this targeting logic could dramatically improve the system performance. Additionally, 
this could support comparisons of alternative strategies such as limited sensors with long 
ranges developing firing solutions based on changes in bearing rate vs the use of large 
numbers of short-range sensors developing a solution by tracking sensor activation 
history. The software engineering efforts to develop targeting logic algorithms could be 
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incorporated in the robust menu of targeting logics required in an operational MFSA 
system.  
Finally, the team recognized an opportunity to employ MBSE techniques in the 
integration of MFSA into a larger Systems of Systems. While this integration effort was 
beyond the scope of this capstone, it would be critical to the successful implementation of 
a MFSA system. The capability provided by a MFSA system relies on integration with 
appropriate users, other warfare planning systems, naval doctrine, policy, and logistics 
support. This integration effort must articulate the value of MFSA to the Navy’s mission. 
These lines of effort would support transitioning the Mental Focus Simulation 
Application to the next step in the system life cycle and inform the next generation of 
undersea warfare systems. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
Recent technological advances have led to the emergence of distributed 
wireless sensor and actor networks (WSANs) which are capable of 
observing the physical world, processing the data, making decisions based 
on the observations and performing appropriate actions. (Akyildiz and 
Kasimoglu 2004, 351) 
The Mental Focus team also identified three areas for future study. WSANs are a 
class of systems, analogous to the FUWS concept, that have been studied over the past 
decade. While not a “wireless” network, the FUWS consists of sensors and actors 
(weapons) as nodes in a weapon system network. By applying the understanding gained 
in the study of WSAN sensor-actor coordination and actor-actor coordination to the 
FUWS system, the student may be able to identify requirements that support robust and 
fault tolerant FUWS decision algorithms.  
For ad hoc sensor networks, routing protocols must deal with some unique 
constraints such as limited power, low bandwidth, high error rate, and 
dynamic topology, which motivate us to explore routing protocols that are 
energy efficient, self-adaptive, and error tolerant.  (Wu et al. 2009, 282) 
This leads to the second area of recommended future study, ad hoc sensor 
networks. Qishi Wu highlights some of the sensor network requirements that were not 
explored in the scope of this project. Specifically, the required routing protocols that 
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support sensor-sensor and sensor-actor exchange of information and coordination. The 
application of network science to support the development of dynamic, ad hoc network 
protocols that support sensor and weapon re-seeding through the FUWS deployment 
cycle would support evaluation of FUWS sustainability requirements. 
A primary reason for the popularity of ABM and its departure from other 
simulation paradigms is that ABM can simulate and help examine 
organized complex systems (OCS). This means the ABM paradigm can 
represent large systems consisting of many subsystem interactions. (Heath 
et al. 2009)  
Finally, the ABM technique used in Chapter VI could be used in MBSE analysis 
of solution architectures and approaches in other warfare systems. For example, an ABM 
model could be used to show how an air and missile defense system capability varies 
with threat axis or is overwhelmed by a particular threat scenario. The simple simulations 
conducted as part of this project demonstrated the potential power of this approach, 
especially when integrating large quantities of similar component systems or when 
validating autonomous rule sets executed by sub-systems. High fidelity Agent Based 




APPENDIX A: FUWS TASKS AND MEASURES  
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) are 
tools used for articulating mission requirements and for evaluating mission readiness 
(OPNAVINST 3500.38B). The JCIDS User Manual requires capability requirements to 
be traceable to universal joint tasks (UJTs) and Service tasks (2015, B-3). This appendix 
provides a summary of the tasks and the associated measures of performance (M#) 
identified in the task lists that are traceable to mining operations and to FUWS 
capabilities. From the descriptions and established hierarchy, one can see that mining 
capabilities are traceable to the Counter-mobility task at the operational and strategic 
levels. The following UJTs are quoted from the UJTL at the time of the report. Trailing 
citations indicate the date the task was last approved or modified by the Director of the 
Joint Staff. 
ST 1.5 Conduct Countermobility. Delay, channel, or stop offensive air, 
land, and sea movement by an enemy formation attempting to achieve 
concentration for strategic advantage.  
Notes: This task may include actions to shape, at the strategic level, 
enemy retrograde operations to allow friendly exploitation.  
M1 Days Delay an enemy’s operations and movement because of friendly 
systems of barriers, obstacles, and mines. 
M2 % Of designated forces actually assigned to monitor and enforce 
friendly strategic barriers to enemy mobility. 
M3 % Of enemy force channeled into an unfavorable avenue of approach 
by friendly system of obstacles or barriers. 
M4 % Reduction in enemy’s logistics flow (to below requirements for 
offensive action). 
(UJT approved 06-MAR-15) 
 
ST 1.5.1 Employ Obstacles. Channelize, delay, disrupt or reduce the 
enemy and protect friendly forces relative to employment of barriers, 
obstacles, and mines.  
Notes: Before hostilities, barriers, obstacles, and minefields can be used as 
flexible deterrent options without posing an offensive threat. Should 
deterrence fail, offensive maritime mining of enemy ports and waters can 
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constrict enemy seaborne economic war sustainment efforts and reduce 
enemy ability to safely deploy maritime forces. Similarly, offensive 
employment of scatterable mines can deny or restrict enemy strategic 
mobility and sustainability efforts. Strategic barriers, obstacles, and 
minefields normally are emplaced around an existing terrain feature (e.g., 
mountain chain or strait) or a manmade structure (e.g., air base, canal, 
highway, or bridge). Selecting locations and emplacing strategic land and 
maritime obstacles should be coordinated among multinational forces 
(MNFs) at all levels. This will preclude limiting friendly operational 
maneuver; conflicting, duplicative, or divergent operations, and possible 
fratricide among MNF. Plans that could impact on other theaters should be 
coordinated to prevent potential mutual interference. This is particularly 
important for maritime minelaying that could affect strategic movement to 
or from other theaters. This task may require assessing and planning 
continuity of operations (COOP) or mission-essential tasks provided 
specific to contractor support for United States (US) and MNFs. 
M1 Days Delay in construction of strategic systems of barriers, obstacles, and 
mines. 
M2 % Of locations for strategic systems of barriers, obstacles, and mines 
surveyed before crisis. 
M3 % Of systems of friendly obstacles and barriers successful in delaying, 
channeling, or stopping enemy offensive action. 
(UJT approved 01-APR-15) 
 
OP 1.4 Provide Countermobility. Conduct countermobility operations to 
shape enemy maneuver and protect friendly forces.  
Notes: Barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare employment is not an end in 
itself, but is in support of the maneuver plan to counter the enemys [sic] 
freedom of maneuver. This task may include support to enforcement of 
sanctions, embargoes, blockades, and no-fly zones.  
M1 % Enemy avenues of approach closed as maneuver possibilities by 
friendly barriers, obstacles, or mines. 
M2 % Monthly reduction in civil populace opinion of target nation central 
government. 
M3 % Reduction in estimated potential enemy course of action (COAs) 
after taking counter-mobility action 
M4 % Of reduction in target nation external trade. 
M5 % Of reduction in target nation gross domestic product. 
(UJT approved 17-AUG-15) 
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OP 1.4.1 Employ System of Obstacles. Restrict enemy maneuver options 
or create friendly maneuver options. 
Notes: This task may include the use of coordinated operational and 
tactical barriers and reinforcement of natural obstacles. Operational 
barriers and obstacles may be created by the composite effect of many 
closely coordinated tactical obstacles or by the reinforcement of natural 
obstacles to form large terrain or massive obstacles. Demolition (obstacles 
are created by detonation of explosives) is generally used to create tactical 
level obstacles. However, it can also be used to create operational 
obstacles such as the destruction of major dams, bridges, and railways, as 
well as highways through built-up areas or terrain chokepoints. 
Constructed obstacles are created without the use of explosives (examples 
are barbed wire obstacles and tank ditches). Field expedient obstacles 
(abatis or flame explosive) can provide a quick, effective means for 
providing a limited offensive and defensive obstacle capability when 
conventional resources are not available.  
 
M1 % Of increase in friendly force lines of communications (LOCs) after 
obstacle emplacement. 
M2 % Of available enemy lines of communications (LOCs) and ports of 
debarkation (PODs) interdicted by friendly obstacles. 
M3 % Of hostile external surface communication absorbed by other lines 
of communications (LOCs) after barrier emplacement. 
M4 % Of hostile internal surface communication absorbed by other lines 
of communications (LOCs) after barrier emplacement. 
M5 % Of reduction in hostile military surface communications after 
barrier emplacement. 
M6 % Of reduction in hostile overall surface communications after barrier 
emplacement. 
M7 % Of reduction in potential enemy course(s) of action (COAs) after 
obstacle emplacement. 
M8 Days Until hostile forces are unable to sustain offensive operations. 
M9 % Of increase in incidence of disease in target nation during 
quarantine or embargo. 
(UJT approved 05-MAY-15) 
 
TA 1.4 Conduct Mine Operations. Conduct mining, to include both sea 
and land mines.  
Notes: Mining is: 1. In land mine warfare — an explosive or material, 
normally encased, designed to destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats, 
or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate personnel. 
It may be detonated by the action of its victim, by the passage of time, or 
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by controlled means. 2. In naval mine warfare — an explosive device laid 
in the water with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring 
shipping from entering an area. The term does not include devices 
attached to the bottoms of ships or to harbor installations by personnel 
operating underwater, nor does it include devices that explode 
immediately on expiration of a predetermined time after laying. May be 
emplaced by land, sea, or air component forces/ means.  
 
M1 % Of planned mines emplaced in accordance with the operation plan. 
(UJT approved 12-MAY-15) 
 
TA 1.4.1 Conduct Offensive Mine Operations. Conduct the offensive 
employment of mines.  
Notes: Location of mines employed need to be maintained in a database 
that can facilitate information sharing with host nation, allies, coalition, 
United States Government agencies, information operations, and 
nongovernmental organizations for stability, security, transition, and 
reconstruction operations. This employment is not an end in itself, but is 
an adjunct to other military capabilities. To conduct the offensive 
employment of mines at the tactical level to delay, disrupt, and attrit 
enemy forces and protect friendly forces. Offensive employment of mines 
can deny or restrict enemy strategic mobility and sustainability efforts. 
Offensive employment of mines can deny or restrict enemy strategic 
mobility and sustainability efforts. This task may delay, disrupt, and attrit 
enemy forces and protect friendly forces.  
 
M1 Hours To develop plans for mine placement (land and maritime). 
M2 Hours To conduct inventory of available mine types and quantity. 
M3 Hours To identify available maritime mine laying capabilities. 
M4 Hours To identify existing mine fields (if applicable). 
M5 Hours To identify enemy avenues of approach and retreat 
(UJT approved 12-MAY-15) 
 
TA 1.4.2 Conduct Defensive Mine Operations. Conduct defensive mine 
operations to degrade the enemys [sic] ability to maneuver, destroy, and 
attrit the enemy force.  
Notes: This task may support economy of force measures; and to retain 
key terrain or areas of significant tactical value. In other words, adding 
depth and time to the operational environment (OE). Minefields can 
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immobilize and canalize enemy forces by taking advantage of terrain by 
adding strength and depth to the OE.  
 
M1 % Of planned mines emplaced in accordance with the operation plan. 
M2 Y/N Was guidance provided regarding control of minefield areas and 
minefield restricted areas? 
(UJT approved 12-MAY-15) 
The following Service tasks are quoted from the UNTL.  
 
NTA 1.4 Conduct Counter-mobility. To construct obstacles and employ 
area denial efforts including mines to delay, disrupt, and destroy the 
enemy. The primary purpose of counter-mobility operations is to slow or 
divert the enemy, to increase time for target acquisition, and to increase 
weapons effectiveness. 
M1 Hours Delay in enemy force movements caused by mines/obstacles. 
M2 % Of enemy forces unable to reach their objective due to obstacles. 
(UNTL 2007, 3-B-16) 
 
NTA 1.4.1 Conduct Mining. To use air, ground, surface, and subsurface 
assets to conduct offensive (deploy mines to tactical advantage of friendly 
forces) and defensive (deploy mines for protection of friendly forces and 
facilities) mining operations.   
M1 Days To develop obstacle/mining plan. 
M2 % Of enemy units delayed due to mining. 
M3 % Of enemy units damaged or destroyed due to mining. 
(UNTL 2007, 3-B-16) 
 
NTA 3.2.1 Attack Enemy Maritime Targets. To attack sea targets with 
the intent to degrade the ability of enemy forces to conduct coordinated 
operations and/or perform critical tasks. This task includes all efforts taken 
to control the battlespace by warfare commanders, including strikes 
against high payoff and high value targets, such as missile launching ships 
and submarines, and other strike and power projection units throughout 
the theater. This task includes also those efforts taken to undermine the 
enemy’s will to fight.   
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M1 % Of attacking systems penetrate to target to deliver ordnance. 
M2 Mins After target identification to complete attack. 
M3 % Of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded. 
(UNTL 2007, 3-B-45) 
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APPENDIX B: MFSA TASKS AND MEASURES 
This appendix provides a summary of the UNTL tasks and the associated 
measures of performance (M#) that are traceable to the tactical capabilities provided by 
MFSA. Note that the quality of the plan is measured by the SIT and number of mines 
required. The following Service tasks are quoted from the UNTL.  
 
NTA 1.4.1.1 Plan Minefields. To sequentially develop an integrated plan 
to emplace minefields which will effectively support the tactical plan. 
Planning consists mainly of establishing obstacle restrictions at higher-
level units and detailed design and citing at lower level units 
M1 Days To develop obstacle/mining plan. 
M2 # Mines to accomplish minefields objectives. 
(UNTL 2007, 3-B-16) 
 
NTA 5.4.3.6 Coordinate Offensive Mining Operations. To coordinate 
offensive mining operations to neutralize opposition maritime firepower 
and minimize threats to friendly forces.  
M1 Hours To coordinate minefield plan and input to MTO. 
M2 Y/N Was planned minefield effectiveness achieved at > 50% SIT? 
M3 Y/N Was minefield re-seeding considered? 
(UNTL 2007, 3-B-90) 
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APPENDIX C: MFSA INPUT REQUIREMENTS 
The MFSA simulation system fills an information need by transforming data 
describing the environment, target, and weapon system into relevant outputs describing 
the weapon system performance. To develop these outputs, MFSA must be provided with 
inputs of environmental, target, weapon system, and mission data. This appendix 
provides additional details on the purpose and usage of the inputs requirements identified 
in Chapter III. In particular this appendix demonstrates the potential effect of a particular 
input parameter on FUWS performance, and thus the purpose of the input in the MFSA 
system. Those parameters assigned as “basic” are necessary to the development of a 
useful performance prediction, those designated as  “intermediate” or “advanced” will 
improve the MFSA prediction accuracy, but will require access to additional data and 
processing power. 
ENVIRONMENTAL INPUT PARAMETERS 
Geographic Boundaries:  According to the International Law, the locations of 
mines must be recorded (Doswald-Beck 1995, Art 83 and 84). As such, minefield should 
have boundaries, which will determine the area of coverage necessary and thus the 
number of weapons required to achieve the desired level of effect.  The geographical 
boundaries also relate to several other characteristics listed below, which if properly 
linked to authoritative databases could automate portions of the input process. 
Water Depth:  While minefields are often visualized in two dimensions, the 
interactions between the mines and targets occur in three dimensions.  Water depth 
directly impacts the performance and operation of sensors, weapons, communicators, and 
target vessels. For instance, the depth of explode-in-place weapons is a significant factor 
in the damage delivered to a particular target.  It also impacts the maneuverability and 
detection capability of mobile weapons such as torpedoes. Shallow water can pose 
challenges to acoustic communicators as surface and bottom reflections complicate the 
communication signal path. The movement of the target vessel (particularly submerged 
targets) and mobile weapons, such as torpedoes, may also be restricted by water depth. In 
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a basic scenario, a single value, such as average water depth, may be adequate to describe 
performance, in more advanced scenarios the contours of a bathymetric profile should be 
used to increase the fidelity of the simulation. 
Bathymetric Profile:  As described above, water depth is a critical variable for a 
minefield simulation to consider.  The bathymetric profile provides contours of the sea 
floor, allowing better understanding of how individual system nodes will be affected by 
the depth at their location and by the potential shadowing of signals in more complex 
profiles. 
Sound Velocity Profile:  The speed at which sound propagates through water 
varies with depth (pressure) and is a function of a number of environmental factors such 
as water temperature and salinity.  The variations in sound velocity affect the path of 
acoustic signals through the water column and thus the performance of acoustic sensors. 
In deep water, this can be significant as the acoustic signal transmission is shaped and 
ducted or isolated by changes in the sound velocity profile. 
Current:  Strong currents will affect mobile effectors, such as torpedoes, 
introducing a source of error in both aim point and fuel usage. If the distance from the 
weapon to the target is substantial, the fire control system must either account for the 
current or risk missing the target. Additionally, currents can impact torpedo fuel usage, 
potentially changes the effective employment range of a weapon.  
Ambient Noise Level:  The magnitude of background acoustic noise in the 
environment, including natural (wind and biological activity) and man-made (shipping) 
sources, can interfere with or obscure signals from the target vessel to FUWS acoustic 
sensors. High ambient noise level could also degrade the effective range of acoustic 
communications, if used. 
Ambient Noise Frequency Range:  For advanced simulations, in which detailed 
technical data is available for relevant system and environmental parameters, the 
frequency range of ambient noise will support more accurately modeling of system 
performance. For instance, low frequency ambient noise will have minimal impacts on 
high frequency acoustic communicators and medium frequency threat signals.  
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Seismic Background Noise: Seismic sensors use vibrations of the seabed to 
detect the proximity of vessels.  In areas with significant seismic activity, FUWS 
planners and developers may want to consider the effects of spurious signals generated 
by natural phenomena. 
Bottom Type / Bottom Loss: Bottom type contributes to both the transmission of 
acoustic signals (hard sand may reflect a signal that is absorbed by soft mud) and the self-
burial of system components.   
Fixed Obstacles:  This optional input serves to account for the signal shadowing 
of known obstacles, such as oilrigs or wreckages, that could impact placement and/or 
operation of FUWS components. 
Probabilistic Obstacles:  This optional input would allow the user to generate 
obstacles based on an estimated probability of occurrence for a given region. Examples of 
such probabilistic obstacles include fishing nets, buoys, and biologics that could degrade 
FUWS performance and operation.  
TARGET INPUT PARAMETERS 
Number:  The number of anticipated targets is required at the basic level to 
determine the threat profile (probability that nth target is damaged).  In advanced 
simulations, the user may want to configure targeting logic based on the ratio of weapons 
available to anticipated targets, conserving weapons for high-value or particular targets. 
Course:  The course describes the path taken by targets through the area, and thus 
the opportunities for detection and engagement by the weapon system. For mobile 
weapons the course of the target affects computation of the fire control solution and 
projected intercept point, the accuracy of which directly impact the success of the 
weapon. 
Speed:  The speed of a vessel will affect the acoustic and pressure signals it 
generates. Also, like course, the speed plays a significant role in the fire control solution 
and projected intercept point required for successful employment of mobile effectors. 
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Target Priority:  When the number of weapons is limited, it may be desirable to 
designate high value targets and employ an advanced targeting logic. For example, a high 
priority target may warrant firing a two shot salvo to maximize the probability of 
success.  Conversely, a low priority target may be allowed to pass by if higher priority 
targets are detected or anticipated. 
Target Mission:  The counter-mobility capability attempts to deny threat vessels 
freedom of movement in or through an area. This implies that the threat vessels have an 
operational need to maneuver to a destination. The axis of this transit or assumed 
direction of travel is important because it affects the optimal orientation of the sensors 
and weapons.  In general, fewer sensors/weapons are required when placed in a pattern 
perpendicular to direction of travel by the target. 
Class/Type:  The class of target vessel can be linked to a number of the following 
characteristics, supporting automatic population of appropriate fields from recognized 
databases. 
Length:  To cause damage, explosive charges must be detonated in close 
proximity to the threat vessel, often in ranges of tens to low hundreds of yards from the 
target. As such, the vessel length, which can be over a hundred yards, can be a significant 
factor in determining both the damage delivered by a warhead and in the appropriate 
timing of weapon engagement.  
Width / Beam:  For an explode-in-place weapon, the vessel width can be a 
significant characteristic in determining the damage delivered by the warhead. In mobile 
weapon scenarios, it can be an important factor in determining the probability of a 
successful engagement. 
Draft:  Vessel draft can be an important factor in the determination of the damage 
caused by explode-in-place weapons.  It is also a significant factor in determining the 
susceptibility of a vessel to active acoustic exploitation by active sensors and active 
homing devices on mobile weapons.  Vessel draft also determines the navigable waters in 
the operating area and the mobility of the target in shallow water. 
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Max Speed:  In advanced simulations, the user may desire to have the target 
vessel attempt to evade a mobile effector by accelerating and maneuvering. The 
maximum speed would provide an upper boundary to ensure the target vessel’s ability to 
evade with speed.  
Damage Susceptibility:  This input provides a measure of the targets 
susceptibility to various weapons. For basic simulations an average or stochastic 
susceptibility may be applied to a vessel.  Alternatively, in more complex analysis, the 
susceptibility may be a function of the area of the ship, allowing the simulation to model 
the mission impact of various target points. 
Hull material:  Hull material may be related to the magnetic signature of the 
target as well as damage susceptibility.  When these factors are unknown, this input 
allows a rough estimation of characteristics to support more detailed simulations. 
Displacement:  Magnetic and acoustic signatures can be positively correlated to 
the displacement of a ship. When these signatures are unknown, the displacement can 
provide a simple proxy for estimating them. The displacement can also be used in 
conjunction with speed and water depth to predict the pressure signal. Finally, larger 
ships tend to have more reserve buoyancy, and thus can be more survivable.   
Magnetic signature: This input parameter is needed to simulate the target’s 
susceptibility to magnetic sensors in both legacy mines and FUWS. 
Acoustic signature: The acoustic signature as a function of speed is needed to 
simulate the target’s susceptibility to acoustic and seismic sensors in both legacy mines 
and FUWS. The acoustic signature could include the frequency distribution in order to 
support simulation of target classification in advanced scenarios.  
Maneuvering tactics:  A target vessel may detect and maneuver to evade an 
incoming torpedo.  The anticipated maneuvering tactics of the adversary will influence 
the lost target tactics implemented by the FUWS.  In the case of targets with better 
torpedo detection capabilities and maneuvering characteristics, the timing of the 
engagement may become critical to success. 
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Ship Countermeasures:  Ships may employ countermeasures and decoys to 
mask their signals and disrupt weapon engagements.  In more advanced simulations these 
countermeasures could be simulated by altering ship signatures and stochastically causing 
false returns to active acoustic sensors.  
Countermeasures Tactics: This input would describe the tactics an adversary 
may use to transit the minefield. It could include attempts to force a channel through the 
minefield, route and speed selection based on bathymetric information, or mine 
hunting/sweeping. 
Mine Hunting Mission:  This parameter describes the probability of success of 
mine hunting in a given area as a function of time.  This could be used by the simulation 
system to predict the expected delay required by the adversary to clear a safe passage 
route and to determine the decay of counter-mobility capability performance parameters 
over time.   
Mine Sweeping Mission: This parameter describes the probability of success of 
mine sweeping a given area as a function of time. As the Mine Hunting Mission 
parameter, this input could be used by the simulation system to predict the expected delay 
required by the adversary to clear a safe passage route and to determine the decay of 
counter-mobility capability performance parameters over time.   
MISSION INPUT PARAMETERS 
Limited Rules of Engagement:  Depending on the phase and nature of the 
conflict, the rules of engagement may be restricted.  For example, under certain 
circumstances the FUWS may be required to have multiple sensors confirm a single 
target to ensure it is a valid combatant.  In other cases, the system may be allowed to fire 
on any transiting vessel based on a single data source.  
Human “in loop” required:  As technology advances to allow greater autonomy 
of systems, policy decisions may be imposed that require a human to decide to engage a 
target.  The latency required could have major implications on a FUWS effectiveness and 
this mode would allow those effects to be quantified. 
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Target Discrimination Required: The ability to simulate the capability of the 
FUWS to differentiate between various types of potential target vessels is likely to be 
important to intermediate and advanced simulations.  A system’s ability to discriminate 
between types of targets may be desired to reduce risk of collateral damage to non-
combatants, or may be desired to reserve weapons for the highest value or most 
susceptible targets.  This mode of simulation would allow the user to understand how 
performance changed against both high-value and low-value targets. 
FUWS INPUT PARAMETERS (SENSORS) 
Number, 1 to n:  The quantity of a particular type of sensor will determine 
coverage based on the position and detection range of each sensor.  This input is intended 
to capture each sensor node or unit, which may be comprised of multiple sensors 
detecting various modalities. 
Position:  This describes the geographical position of a particular sensor relative 
to the rest of the field and is necessary for calculation detections and communication 
neighbors. 
Sensor Type:  The sensor type input describes the identifying characteristics of a 
particular node and may represent a package of sensors, which detect multiple 
modalities.   The aggregate performance of this sensor is described by additional inputs. 
Probability of Detection vs Range:  For simple simulations, or where sufficient 
data is not available, this may be as simple as a single range with a probability of 
detection. More accurate simulations would use a table of probability detections at 
various ranges.  
Bearing Accuracy:  This input would be simulated as errors in the bearing 
passed from sensors would support simulation of the errors in weapon aim points.  
Reliability: Sensor reliability would be used to simulate failure rates and its 
impact on system performance in more advanced simulation.   
Timing:  In advanced simulation, precision timing information could be used to 
support integration of data from multiple sensors, rapidly localizing the threat vessel. 
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Endurance/Power Usage:  Energy is a resource consumed by every action of the 
sensors. Simple simulation may assume a constant value or to time to energy 
exhaustion.  More advanced simulations may benefit from the additional detail provided 
by simulating the power usage to process a contact detection and the consumption based 
on data sampling rate. 
FUWS INPUT PARAMETERS (COMMUNICATORS) 
Range:  The range at which sensors and weapons are able to communicate is 
critical in establishing the nodes to support a robust network architecture.  
Data rate:  The data rate limits the speed of communications between FUWS 
components and can be expected to impact overall system performance. 
Latency: This input describes the time delay at each node required to send and/or 
relay a message.  Combined with data rate, these delays can be used to simulate the age 
of data informing the targeting logic.  
Reliability: Sensor reliability would be used to simulate failure rates and its 
impact on system performance in more advanced simulation. The effect of a 
communication failure on the overall system will depend on the particular FUWS 
networked architecture.   Robust architectures may be able to reroute messages around 
failed communication nodes.  Brittle architectures may collapse if key communication 
lines fail. 
Endurance/Power Usage:  Energy is a resource consumed by every 
transmission. Simple simulation may assume a constant value or to time to energy 
exhaustion.  More advanced simulations will benefit from the additional detail provided 
by simulating the power usage to send each message.  
FUWS INPUT PARAMETERS (WEAPONS) 
Number, 1 to n:  The number of weapons not only establishes the number of 
possible engagements and overall system performance, but also can be used to inform the 
targeting logic, especially when attempting to focus engagements on high-value targets. 
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Weapon Type:  The type of weapon selected will determine some of the 
additional fields below when MFSA is able to pull information from relevant 
databases.  There may be multiple weapon types within a FUWS field. 
Position: This describes the geographical position of a particular weapon relative 
to the rest of the field and is necessary for calculation of communication neighbors and 
engagement opportunities. 
UUV Weapon Batteries:  This input describes how mobile weapons are 
deployed in the area. The UUV may be as simple as a stationary bottom emplacement 
with a single weapon or as complex as a large diameter UUV patrolling with multiple 
torpedoes onboard. 
Intercept Speed: This input describes the speed of the weapon when attempting 
to intercept a target. Higher search speeds reduce the time of the engagement but can also 
alert the target.  
Search Speed: This input describes the speed of the weapon as it searches for the 
target in primary or secondary search modes.  
Explosive Power:  This describes the ability of the weapon to cause 
damage.  The damage transferred to the vessel is a function of the explosive power of the 
weapon, the relative susceptibility of the particular vessel, and the range at time of 
detonation 
Fuel:  This input measures the energy or fuel on a mobile weapon and is used to 
determine the range  
Endurance:  This input is used to describe how a weapon consumes fuel at 
various speeds and search patterns, calculating the effective weapon range. 
Reliability:  Weapon reliability supports simulation of weapon failures and their 
impact on system performance.  
Weapon Search Pattern: MFSA users operators may seek to assess the impact 
of different weapon primary and secondary search patterns on overall system 
performance. 
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Targeting Logic:  This set of parameters describes the decision making process 
used to determine when to engage and where to aim a weapon. The targeting logic could 
also include limits on fire control solution quality, predicted weapon fuel remaining, 
minimum time to engagement, and other ballistic parameters.  
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APPENDIX D: UML ARTIFACTS 
 
Figure 44.  User Interfaces with MFSA 
Figure 44 shows the interactions between the User class and various MFSA 
modules. As seen here, the User is responsible for constructing the architecture in the 
Asset.2.0 FUWS Scenario Architecture Module, running the simulation in the Asset.3.0 
Simulation Module and reading and interpreting the reports provided by Asset.4.0 Output 
Report Module. 
 
Figure 45.  Software Infrastructure in User Mode 
Figure 45 shows the interactions between the MFSA Software Infrastructure and 
other MFSA modules during operation by the User. As seen here, the Software 
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Infrastructure supports the other modules by providing the user interface environment 
and programming backbone required by the various MFSA modules.  
 
Figure 46.  Decomposition of FUWS Scenario Architecture Module 
Figure 46 shows the decomposition of the FUWS Scenario Architecture Module 
into component classes.  
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Figure 47.  Simulation Module Interfaces 
Figure 47 shows the interactions between the Simulation Module and other MFSA 
modules. As seen here, the Simulation Module inputs are provided by the FUWS 
Scenario Architecture Module and outputs are provided to the Output Report Module.  
 
Figure 48.  System Administrator Interfaces 
This class diagram shows the interactions between the System Administrator class 
and various MFSA modules. As seen here, the System Administrator is responsible for 
updating and maintaining the other modules.  
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Figure 49.  MFSA Software Infrastructure in Maintenance Mode 
This class diagram shows the interactions between the MFSA Software 
Infrastructure and other MFSA modules during operation by the System Administrator. 
As seen here, the Software Infrastructure supports the other modules by providing the 
user interface environment required for the System Administrator to access the various 




APPENDIX E: MFSA REQUIREMENT TRACEABILITY 
 
Figure 50.  Establish Minefield Architecture Requirements  
Figure 50 shows the decomposition of Req.1.0 Establish Minefield Architecture 
and traceability of the requirement to system actions and interfaces. 
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Figure 51.  Output Simulation Data Requirements 
Figure 51 shows the decomposition of Req.2.0 Output Simulation Data and 
traceability of the requirement to system actions and interfaces. 
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Figure 52.  Run Simulation Requirements 
Figure 52 shows the decomposition of Req.3.0 Run Simulation and traceability of 




Figure 53.  Update System Requirements 
Figure 53 shows the decomposition of Req.4.0 Update by System Administrator 
and traceability of the requirement to system actions and interfaces. 
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APPENDIX F: PROTOTYPE TOOL SELECTION 
Early in the project execution, the team conducted an analysis of available 
simulation environments and programming languages to support the development of the 
MFSA prototype. The team considered the following five capability requirements when 
evaluating each available simulation tool: 
• Functionality. Does the tool have the features and capabilities necessary to model 
FUWS architecture, targeting logic, threat scenarios and MOEs?  Does the tool 
have the desired level of complexity? 
• Accessibility. Is the tool available for team use?  Are there licensing concerns or 
data classification concerns? 
• Ease of Use/ Learning Curve. How easy is it to build a model in the tool or write 
the code?  Are there helpful tutorials or user guides? 
• Display Graphical Interface. Does the tool have the desired display output to 
show the minefield configuration and the flow of threats through the minefield? 
• Collaborative Ability. How easy is it for geographically diverse team members to 
work collaboratively on building the model while maintaining configuration 
control? 
The team performed a quick pairwise comparison of these requirements to 
determine a relative weighting factor for each. As seen in Figure 54, accessibility and 
functionality were considered the most important requirements to the team. The team was 
confident that their collective skills and experience could compensate for lack of 
familiarity with the selected simulation tool (Ease of Use / Learning Curve).  
 
Figure 54.  Pairwise Comparison of Modeling Tool Requirements.  
The project team considered four simulation tools as backbones for development 
of the demonstration prototype. Requirement scores of 9 (provides all, or nearly all of the 
Criteria 1 2 3 4 5 Weights
Functionality
1 1 1/2 4 2 2 0.2353
Functionality 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Accessibility
2 2 1 8 4 4 0.4706
Functionality 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Ease of Use
Learning Curve
3 1/4 1/8 1 1/2 1/2 0.0588
Functionality 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Graphical Interface/
Display
4 1/2 1/4 2 1 1 0.1176
Functionality 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Collaborative Ability
5 1/2 1/4 2 1 1 0.1176
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required capability), 3 (provides some of the required capability), 1 (provides very 
limited) and 0 (provides no capability) were used to evaluate each system against each of 
the selection requirements. An overall suitability score for each tool was calculated using 
the sum-product of the requirement scores and requirement weighting factors from the 
pairwise analysis. As seen in Figure 55, Netlogo was ranked as the best tool based on its 
high evaluation scores on functionality and accessibility.  
  
Figure 55.  Analysis of Modeling Tools 
Also of note, Netlogo was the modeling tool with the highest score in 
collaborative ability. ExtenSim ranked second, falling slightly short of NetLogo in almost 
all evaluation criteria. Microsoft Excel, while widely accessible and easy to use, did not 
have nearly the required functionality or the desired display interfaces to make it a viable 
option. Finally, Naval Simulation System (NSS) promised the required functionality, but 









































































APPENDIX G: PROTOTYPE DEMO 
The Mental Focus prototype demo can be viewed and downloaded from the 
Netlogo modeling commons at http://modelingcommons.org/browse/one_model/4474.   
The following screenshots from the demo user interface are used to explain the 
interface and highlight the delivered features. 
Figure 56 shows a FUWS architecture scenario. Light blue circles represent the 
distributed sensors with the range based network communications paths shown in grey. 
The light blue exes show the UUV weapon batteries. The red lines show the path 
histories taken by hostile ships transiting the area, allowing the user to visualize the tactic 
used by the threat ships. 
 
 









Figure 57 shows a legacy architecture scenario. The interface remains the same, 
as do many of the graphics. However, one can see that the sensors and UUV weapon 
batteries are replaced by light blue circles with exes show the mines. Additionally, there 
are no communication paths between the mines, and thus no network. 
 
Figure 57.  MFSA Demo – Legacy 
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APPENDIX H: PROTOTYPE SIMULATION RESULTS 
This appendix provides the summary statistics, including box plots of the SIT and 
EC results for the Monte Carlo simulations discussed in Chapter VI. As in Chapter VI, 
the legacy results are highlighted in blue and the FUWS results in green to provide visual 
discrimination between the graphs and tables. 
Figures 58 and 59 show the performance of legacy systems as a function of the 
number of mines deployed. For each number of mines, there are two data points, one for 
each number of minelines considered. Note that as the number of mines is increased, the 
performance (SIT or EC) increases as well.  
Figures 60 and 61 similarly show the performance of FUWS architectures as a 
function of the number of UUV batteries to which the mobile weapons (torpedoes) are 
deployed. For each number of UUV batteries, there are four data points corresponding to 
the number of sensors and sensor lines considered. In general, for a given UUV 
configuration, increasing the number of sensors and the number of sensor lines tends to 
increase performance. Increasing the number of UUVs does not appear to appreciably 
impact the system performance. However, one should also note the significantly larger 
variation shown in the box plots for the FUWS systems. Improving the deployment 
algorithm to ensure UUV’s are within range of the sensor network(s) and improving the 





Figure 58.  Boxplot: SIT versus Number of Mines 
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Table 16.   Summary Statistics 50 Mines in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.195 0.494 0.298 0.175 0.099 0.071 0.058 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.165 0.495 0.320 0.175 0.090 0.070 0.060 
s2 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
S 0.084 0.031 0.060 0.040 0.021 0.020 0.024 
CV 0.070 0.063 0.200 0.229 0.209 0.278 0.421 
xmax 1.33 0.55 0.39 0.23 0.14 0.12 0.10 
x75% 1.26 0.52 0.33 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.07 
x50% 1.17 0.50 0.32 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.06 
x25% 1.14 0.48 0.27 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.04 
xmin 1.10 0.44 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.02 
 
Table 17.   Summary Statistics 50 Mines in 10 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.231 0.502 0.304 0.182 0.101 0.078 0.064 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.200 0.495 0.305 0.160 0.110 0.080 0.060 
s2 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
S 0.110 0.042 0.035 0.044 0.029 0.023 0.025 
CV 0.090 0.083 0.116 0.243 0.292 0.297 0.390 
xmax 1.49 0.59 0.36 0.28 0.13 0.14 0.11 
x75% 1.30 0.53 0.33 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.08 
x50% 1.20 0.50 0.31 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.06 
x25% 1.15 0.48 0.28 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.06 
xmin 1.11 0.44 0.25 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.02 
 
Table 18.   Summary Statistics 60 Mines in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.401 0.559 0.348 0.200 0.136 0.092 0.066 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.385 0.560 0.330 0.190 0.140 0.095 0.055 
s2 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
S 0.098 0.055 0.054 0.040 0.035 0.034 0.030 
CV 0.070 0.098 0.154 0.202 0.259 0.373 0.456 
xmax 1.60 0.63 0.43 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.11 
x75% 1.47 0.61 0.40 0.23 0.16 0.10 0.10 
x50% 1.39 0.56 0.33 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.06 
x25% 1.32 0.51 0.32 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.04 
xmin 1.27 0.48 0.28 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.03 
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Table 19.   Summary Statistics 60 Mines in 10 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.412 0.544 0.339 0.227 0.152 0.075 0.075 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.415 0.555 0.335 0.220 0.155 0.075 0.075 
s2 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
S 0.114 0.036 0.047 0.039 0.021 0.022 0.025 
CV 0.080 0.066 0.140 0.172 0.140 0.288 0.333 
xmax 1.63 0.58 0.42 0.33 0.18 0.11 0.11 
x75% 1.44 0.57 0.38 0.23 0.17 0.09 0.10 
x50% 1.42 0.56 0.34 0.22 0.16 0.08 0.08 
x25% 1.40 0.54 0.30 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.06 
xmin 1.20 0.46 0.27 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.03 
 
Table 20.   Summary Statistics 70 Mines in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.590 0.611 0.376 0.239 0.162 0.123 0.079 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.605 0.605 0.380 0.230 0.180 0.120 0.080 
s2 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
S 0.101 0.040 0.045 0.040 0.035 0.030 0.018 
CV 0.064 0.065 0.121 0.169 0.215 0.247 0.230 
xmax 1.73 0.69 0.43 0.30 0.20 0.17 0.11 
x75% 1.68 0.62 0.42 0.28 0.19 0.15 0.09 
x50% 1.61 0.61 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.08 
x25% 1.49 0.59 0.34 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.07 
xmin 1.45 0.56 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.04 
 
Table 21.   Summary Statistics 70 Mines in 10 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.717 0.656 0.415 0.262 0.175 0.121 0.088 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.740 0.665 0.425 0.270 0.185 0.115 0.070 
s2 0.010 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
S 0.095 0.047 0.059 0.033 0.032 0.024 0.029 
CV 0.055 0.072 0.143 0.125 0.183 0.197 0.325 
xmax 1.85 0.73 0.52 0.30 0.21 0.18 0.14 
x75% 1.75 0.69 0.44 0.29 0.20 0.13 0.11 
x50% 1.74 0.67 0.43 0.27 0.19 0.12 0.07 
x25% 1.67 0.63 0.38 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.07 
xmin 1.51 0.55 0.30 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.05 
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Table 22.   Summary Statistics 80 Mines in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.826 0.656 0.461 0.277 0.204 0.122 0.106 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.820 0.660 0.460 0.275 0.215 0.120 0.110 
s2 0.013 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 
S 0.110 0.045 0.049 0.033 0.049 0.026 0.019 
CV 0.060 0.068 0.106 0.120 0.241 0.213 0.180 
xmax 2.00 0.73 0.56 0.35 0.26 0.18 0.14 
x75% 1.90 0.69 0.49 0.29 0.24 0.13 0.12 
x50% 1.82 0.66 0.46 0.28 0.22 0.12 0.11 
x25% 1.74 0.63 0.43 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.09 
xmin 1.66 0.58 0.39 0.23 0.09 0.08 0.08 
 
Table 23.   Summary Statistics 80 Mines in 10 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 1.899 0.651 0.474 0.303 0.193 0.153 0.125 
𝒙𝒙�trim 1.850 0.640 0.485 0.295 0.190 0.160 0.140 
s2 0.011 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
S 0.098 0.021 0.037 0.047 0.039 0.047 0.035 
CV 0.052 0.032 0.077 0.154 0.201 0.307 0.280 
xmax 2.13 0.69 0.51 0.39 0.25 0.23 0.16 
x75% 1.95 0.67 0.51 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.15 
x50% 1.85 0.64 0.49 0.30 0.19 0.16 0.14 
x25% 1.83 0.63 0.45 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.10 
xmin 1.81 0.63 0.40 0.25 0.14 0.07 0.06 
 
Table 24.   Summary Statistics 90 Mines in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 2.004 0.691 0.497 0.339 0.219 0.143 0.115 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.000 0.710 0.500 0.340 0.220 0.140 0.115 
s2 0.018 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
S 0.126 0.057 0.043 0.041 0.036 0.032 0.028 
CV 0.063 0.082 0.086 0.120 0.166 0.223 0.247 
xmax 2.16 0.76 0.55 0.39 0.26 0.19 0.16 
x75% 2.13 0.74 0.54 0.38 0.26 0.17 0.13 
x50% 2.00 0.71 0.50 0.34 0.22 0.14 0.12 
x25% 1.90 0.65 0.47 0.33 0.19 0.12 0.09 
xmin 1.81 0.59 0.41 0.26 0.16 0.09 0.08 
 128 
Table 25.   Summary Statistics 90 Mines in 10 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 2.111 0.699 0.527 0.361 0.228 0.174 0.122 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.065 0.690 0.530 0.355 0.240 0.165 0.125 
s2 0.023 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.000 
S 0.145 0.041 0.040 0.048 0.049 0.026 0.017 
CV 0.069 0.058 0.076 0.132 0.214 0.150 0.136 
xmax 2.38 0.78 0.58 0.46 0.31 0.23 0.15 
x75% 2.19 0.72 0.56 0.40 0.26 0.18 0.13 
x50% 2.07 0.69 0.53 0.36 0.24 0.17 0.13 
x25% 2.02 0.67 0.51 0.32 0.18 0.16 0.11 
xmin 1.90 0.65 0.45 0.30 0.15 0.14 0.10 
 
Table 26.   Summary Statistics 100 Mines in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 2.188 0.776 0.525 0.365 0.242 0.150 0.130 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.165 0.785 0.520 0.370 0.260 0.145 0.140 
s2 0.014 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
S 0.114 0.041 0.075 0.034 0.037 0.035 0.028 
CV 0.052 0.052 0.142 0.093 0.152 0.237 0.212 
xmax 2.43 0.85 0.64 0.42 0.28 0.21 0.16 
x75% 2.20 0.80 0.58 0.39 0.27 0.18 0.16 
x50% 2.17 0.79 0.52 0.37 0.26 0.15 0.14 
x25% 2.13 0.74 0.48 0.35 0.22 0.12 0.11 
xmin 2.00 0.72 0.41 0.29 0.17 0.11 0.08 
 
Table 27.   Summary Statistics 100 Mines in 10 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝒙𝒙� 2.250 0.749 0.559 0.372 0.258 0.175 0.137 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.240 0.750 0.545 0.360 0.260 0.185 0.140 
s2 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
S 0.099 0.041 0.043 0.039 0.039 0.035 0.037 
CV 0.044 0.055 0.077 0.104 0.150 0.202 0.273 
xmax 2.45 0.82 0.64 0.45 0.32 0.23 0.20 
x75% 2.32 0.77 0.59 0.39 0.29 0.19 0.15 
x50% 2.24 0.75 0.55 0.36 0.26 0.19 0.14 
x25% 2.17 0.72 0.54 0.35 0.23 0.15 0.11 




Figure 60.  Boxplot: SIT versus Number of Mines 
 







































Number of UUVs 
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Table 28.   Summary Statistics 1 UUV and 50 Sensors in 2 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 2.465 0.421 0.421 0.414 0.415 0.419 0.377 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.370 0.403 0.415 0.400 0.405 0.410 0.360 
s2 0.100 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
S 0.308 0.067 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.050 0.057 
CV 0.125 0.159 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.118 0.151 
xmax 3.25 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.55 0.50 
x75% 2.59 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.41 
x50% 2.38 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.36 
x25% 2.26 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.33 
xmin 2.07 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.30 
 
Table 29.   Summary Statistics 1 UUV and 50 Sensors in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 2.930 0.494 0.504 0.486 0.493 0.494 0.459 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.940 0.493 0.518 0.485 0.485 0.490 0.445 
s2 0.136 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 
S 0.360 0.071 0.067 0.066 0.061 0.071 0.056 
CV 0.123 0.143 0.133 0.135 0.124 0.143 0.123 
xmax 3.94 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.59 
x75% 3.07 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.48 
x50% 2.94 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.45 
x25% 2.68 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.42 
xmin 2.32 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.36 0.39 
 
Table 30.   Summary Statistics 1 UUV and 100 Sensors in 2 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 3.120 0.535 0.526 0.534 0.526 0.524 0.476 
𝒙𝒙�trim 3.105 0.533 0.528 0.530 0.528 0.528 0.473 
s2 0.081 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 
S 0.278 0.055 0.040 0.057 0.050 0.044 0.065 
CV 0.089 0.103 0.075 0.107 0.094 0.083 0.137 
xmax 3.73 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.62 
x75% 3.32 0.59 0.54 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.51 
x50% 3.10 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.48 
x25% 2.95 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.44 
xmin 2.55 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.37 
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Table 31.   Summary Statistics 1 UUV and 100 Sensors in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 3.507 0.598 0.604 0.596 0.585 0.577 0.547 
𝒙𝒙�trim 3.693 0.633 0.630 0.620 0.613 0.588 0.583 
s2 0.348 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.011 
S 0.575 0.102 0.105 0.095 0.100 0.090 0.102 
CV 0.164 0.171 0.174 0.159 0.170 0.157 0.186 
xmax 4.38 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.77 0.71 0.68 
x75% 3.92 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.62 
x50% 3.70 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.59 
x25% 3.21 0.54 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.51 
xmin 2.30 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.34 
 
Table 32.   Summary Statistics 2 UUV and 50 Sensors in 2 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 2.644 0.456 0.447 0.469 0.440 0.445 0.388 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.520 0.438 0.428 0.453 0.423 0.428 0.383 
s2 0.301 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.008 
S 0.534 0.097 0.098 0.089 0.098 0.090 0.088 
CV 0.202 0.213 0.220 0.189 0.224 0.202 0.226 
xmax 4.12 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.62 
x75% 2.83 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.41 
x50% 2.52 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.39 
x25% 2.29 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.34 
xmin 2.01 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.29 0.34 0.25 
 
Table 33.   Summary Statistics 2 UUV and 50 Sensors in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 3.025 0.530 0.514 0.517 0.508 0.510 0.446 
𝒙𝒙�trim 3.028 0.520 0.510 0.525 0.510 0.500 0.450 
s2 0.064 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 
S 0.246 0.067 0.056 0.063 0.047 0.052 0.042 
CV 0.081 0.126 0.109 0.122 0.092 0.102 0.094 
xmax 3.52 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.53 
x75% 3.18 0.60 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.47 
x50% 3.05 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.45 
x25% 2.83 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.43 
xmin 2.49 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.37 
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Table 34.   Summary Statistics 2 UUV and 100 Sensors in 2 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 3.264 0.562 0.569 0.576 0.558 0.529 0.472 
𝒙𝒙�trim 3.318 0.583 0.578 0.590 0.553 0.535 0.485 
s2 0.120 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 
S 0.338 0.068 0.073 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.066 
CV 0.103 0.121 0.129 0.096 0.102 0.104 0.140 
xmax 3.63 0.65 0.68 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.56 
x75% 3.51 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.52 
x50% 3.30 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.49 
x25% 3.08 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.43 
xmin 2.13 0.38 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.28 
 
Table 35.   Summary Statistics 2 UUV and 100 Sensors in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 3.818 0.669 0.683 0.672 0.642 0.612 0.541 
𝒙𝒙�trim 3.980 0.710 0.708 0.698 0.673 0.625 0.563 
s2 0.316 0.013 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.008 
S 0.548 0.109 0.103 0.100 0.096 0.077 0.086 
CV 0.144 0.164 0.151 0.150 0.149 0.126 0.159 
xmax 4.42 0.77 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.70 0.67 
x75% 4.15 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.67 0.59 
x50% 3.99 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.67 0.63 0.56 
x25% 3.83 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.60 0.60 0.53 
xmin 2.42 0.38 0.45 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.31 
 
Table 36.   Summary Statistics 3 UUV and 50 Sensors in 2 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 2.819 0.496 0.501 0.490 0.481 0.457 0.395 
𝒙𝒙�trim 2.690 0.465 0.483 0.465 0.478 0.450 0.385 
s2 0.212 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 
S 0.449 0.085 0.089 0.086 0.077 0.066 0.075 
CV 0.159 0.172 0.178 0.176 0.161 0.144 0.189 
xmax 4.00 0.69 0.77 0.70 0.68 0.59 0.57 
x75% 3.04 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.44 
x50% 2.69 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.38 
x25% 2.46 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.34 
xmin 2.35 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.29 
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Table 37.   Summary Statistics 3 UUV and 50 Sensors in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 3.072 0.537 0.521 0.536 0.536 0.498 0.445 
𝒙𝒙�trim 3.045 0.545 0.523 0.533 0.543 0.495 0.445 
s2 0.082 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
S 0.279 0.060 0.057 0.059 0.056 0.058 0.055 
CV 0.091 0.112 0.110 0.110 0.104 0.117 0.125 
xmax 3.51 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.54 
x75% 3.28 0.59 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.49 
x50% 3.05 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.45 
x25% 2.96 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.42 
xmin 2.41 0.37 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.32 
 
Table 38.   Summary Statistics 3 UUV and 100 Sensors in 2 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 3.546 0.630 0.616 0.629 0.614 0.574 0.485 
𝒙𝒙�trim 3.513 0.640 0.613 0.635 0.605 0.568 0.488 
s2 0.118 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 
S 0.334 0.060 0.063 0.073 0.068 0.059 0.062 
CV 0.094 0.096 0.102 0.116 0.111 0.103 0.128 
xmax 4.38 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.70 0.61 
x75% 3.74 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.65 0.61 0.52 
x50% 3.49 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.49 
x25% 3.37 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.46 
xmin 2.95 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.33 
 
Table 39.   Summary Statistics 3 UUV and 100 Sensors in 5 Lines 
 EC SIT T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
n 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
𝒙𝒙� 4.022 0.729 0.711 0.712 0.709 0.641 0.522 
𝒙𝒙�trim 4.093 0.733 0.710 0.715 0.728 0.645 0.535 
s2 0.051 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 
S 0.221 0.051 0.052 0.046 0.055 0.038 0.044 
CV 0.055 0.070 0.073 0.065 0.078 0.059 0.085 
xmax 4.30 0.80 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.70 0.60 
x75% 4.15 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.67 0.54 
x50% 4.10 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.65 0.54 
x25% 3.97 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.51 
xmin 3.37 0.58 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.41 
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APPENDIX I: USER INTERFACE DEMO 
To support MFSA architectural design and discovery of user interface 
requirements, the Mental Focus team created the following graphics to support 
visualizing the MFSA graphic user interfaces (GUI) in various user scenarios. To 
enhance user acceptance, the team patterned the GUI design on typical Department of 
Defense software products, including the Global Command and Control System – 
Maritime (GCCS-M) currently used as the backbone for minefield planning tools such as 
the Mine Warfare Decision Aide Library (MEDAL). 
Figure 62 shows the MFSA concept GUI during the creation and setup of a 
simulation scenario for analysis by an operational planner. 
 
Figure 62.  Simulation Setup 
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Across the top of the window is the user navigation and control section of the 
GUI; including features common to most desktop applications. Below this is a toolbar 
where the user can control the simulation, and toggle user modes and views. Along the 
left is a scenario directory, which presents the model components in a tabular form. This 
directory allows the user to quickly view and edit components, including the statistical 
properties driving the simulation. The visualization window shows the geographic layout 
of system components, including in this case a hybrid system of mines, sensors and 
weapons, as well as the boundaries of the counter-mobility area and geographic features. 
The team envisions that, upon opening a new simulation activity, the user would 
select the geographic location, loading in all environmental and topographic properties 
for the area of interest. Figure 60 shows a navigational straight with topographic 
information displayed as a textured over-lay on the water (black) and land (orange). 
Using a pen tool, the user could define input and output boundaries as vector, including 
multiple points as needed for the required fidelity. The green boundary in Figure 60 
represents the input source for threats, where threats originate, and the red boundary 
provides the target goal for navigational success, representing a failure of the undersea 
weapon system.   
For adding new assets to the system, the user can select one of the “add” buttons 
across the top navigation and place it visually on the map in the visualization window. 
Alternatively, the user can add components using the scenario directory and specify the 
placement in the asset’s properties using an input or randomized location.  
Figure 63 shows the MFSA concept GUI during a visualized simulation run. It 
shows a hostile ship, a red dot, transiting from the input boundary along a navigable path 
into the straight. The target’s path is traced with a line when visualizing the simulation to 
support understanding the target’s selected path and it’s impact on system performance. 
At each step in the simulation, MFSA determines the status of detecting sensors. Figure 
63 shows a white ring around a detecting sensor, with a radius equal to the range of the 
threat from the sensor. This allows the user to visualize the likely detection range of the 
sensor had the threat taken an alternative path, and confirm the adequacy of sensor 
coverage.   
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Figure 63.  Simulation Run 
MFSA should also support visualization of the communications transfer between 
FUWS components. Figure 63 shows a sensor reporting (dashed white line) to a mobile 
weapon asset battery the detection of the hostile warship. As additional sensors are 
triggered and the system launches an intercept weapon, MFSA would graphically display 
these milestones. As an appropriate weapon is identified and launched toward a projected 
intercept point, the path of the weapon would be displayed as well. The purpose of 
visualizing of each step in this process is to provide the user an understanding of the 
model response, allowing the user to understand the value provided by individual 
components based on location and performance properties. Alternatively, the user could 
disable visualizations when conducting large numbers of Monte Carlo simulations to 
support statistical analysis. 
Figure 64 shows a potential visualization of MFSA output data. While the 
reporting features of MFSA could provide a catalog of the simulation record including 
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milestone events such as the change in state of assets in the field of operation, the 
selected output performance parameters, such as SIT and EC, would need to be readily 
available to the user. The team also envisioned the capability to provide a gradient map, 
similar to what may be seen in computational fluid dynamics or finite element analysis 
programs, that would show the system performance across the area. MFSA could use 
color-coding to indicate areas where performance achieved a specified level of 
performance and areas where the system assumed risk. In Figure 64, green regions 
signify areas with the lowest risk of failure against the threat, while yellow and red 
regions indicate areas where the threat can operate with relative safety. In other words, 
green regions are well defended, while red are less so. This allows the user to identify 
areas that may require additional sensors or weapon coverage and supports a more 
sophisticated system deployment  
 
Figure 64.  Simulation Output 
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